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Resistance to Mediation:
Understanding and Handling It *

Maria R. Volpe
Charles Bahn
ABSTRACT
One of the major challenges confronting mediators is the resistance to their
intervention efforts by disputants. This article examines some of the explanations for resistance to the mediation process as well as suggested ways of coping with resistant disuptants.

As mediation grows in acceptance, popularity, and diversity, a variety of
new challenges are confronting mediators. An increasingly important area
of concern for mediators is resistance to their intervention efforts by disputants. And, the fact that mediation is now being used as a compulsory
court intervention process (as a result of legislation, policies or regulations)
makes understanding of resistance for mediators even more critical, (e.g.,
Freedman 1984).
Practitioners involved in a wide range of problem-solving and intervention processes, particularly those in mental health work, have long been
aware of the phenomenon of resistance by patients or clients, (e.g.,
Anderson and Stewart 1983; Strean 1985). In fact, understanding the causes
* Printed with permission of Plenum Publishing Company. This article originally appeared in
Negotiation Journal, 3(1987), 297-305.
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of resistance is an integral part of their professional education and training,
and a body of literature on resistance theory has been built up. With few
exceptions (e.g., Folberg and Taylor 1984), there is little in the mediation
literature focused on resistant behavior that has been written specifically
for mediators. This void is especially significant since many mediators do
not have a mental health background and may not have received any education or training in detecting or handling resistance.

The Mediation Process
Generally speaking, mediation can be defined as a short-term, task-oriented, participatory intervention process in which disputants voluntarily
agree to work with a third party to reach a mutually satisfactory and balanced agreement. Depending on the nature of the case, mediation processes
and outcomes may be quasi-therapeutic as well as quasi-legal.
Mediation, not unlike other intervention processes (such as counseling,
therapy and social work), frequently engenders resistance from clients or
patients who arc required to face problems and deal directly with them.
Individuals confronted with problems often do things which have the effect
of impeding the very efforts that can help them. This occurs whether or not
they have overtly made the commitment to participate in the process and
despite the costs, emotional and/or practical.
Disputants are often still mired in the win-lose mode as they begin the
mediation process. And, unlike many other intervention processes, mediation usually engages the disputants directly in the resolution process to
thrash it out face-to-facc.
While it is not expected—nor appropriate—for mediators to deal directly
with the intricacies of resistance emanating from the intrapsychic world of
a disputant, it is nonetheless imperative that mediators understand the
dimensions of resistances so that they can more effectively deal with the
mediatable issues.
Resistance
We define resistance as actions by parties, both conscious and unconscious, that forestall, disrupt and/or impede change designed to alter
customary behaviors. While resistance is typically seen as undesirable and
dysfunctional, it may in fact serve some useful purpose. For example, dealing with resistance satisfactorily can facilitate resolution. Alternatively, it

28

SOCIOLOGICAL PRACTICE/1992

can slow down or halt the decision-making process. Resistance is universal and manifests itself in many ways, some of which are obvious while
others are subtly disguised as something else.
Resistance is known to practitioners in all fields that attempt to introduce
new or different ways of doing things. Depending on the field of practice,
the practitioners' response to resistance will vary. In fact, because of the
many ways that resistance may appear and the different types of practitioners who confront this problem, the literature in the more established
intervention fields offers countless theoretical perspectives and intervention
modalities addressing resistance, (e.g., Anderson and Stewart 1983; Strean
1985). However, unlike long-term intervention processes where the intervener attempts to overcome client resistance by talking about feelings and
actions over time, mediation requires that the mediator come to grips with
the resistance more directly and quickly.
Furthermore, because their process is agreement-oriented, mediators
may not always be aware of the need to be concerned about resistance or
have the time to handle it. Mediators, nonetheless, should understand the
resistance factor and why it sometimes occurs. In doing so, the mediator
may avoid actions that may in fact contribute to disputants' resistance to
the mediation process and hamper the work with the mediator. Simply
stated, you cannot ignore resistance. If you try to ignore it, you may exacerbate its effects.
Resistance to Mediation: Some Explanations
Situational: Perceptions of Contemporary Mediation
One commonly held belief is that resistance to the mediation process is
a direct result of the widespread lack of information about the process. It
is widely believed that, because the use of mediation is a relatively new
method in virtually all areas except labor, the process would be used more
frequently, willingly and effectively by disputants if it were better known
and understood. Some people even confuse the word "mediation" with
"meditation." And, even among more sophisticated people, is not readily
distinguished from other intervention processes, particularly arbitration.
Hence, there is a considerable need to inform the public about mediation.
A second explanation focuses on mediation's relationship to the legal
system. It is often argued that mediation in most sectors operates in the
shadow of the law and that legal practitioners serve as gatekeepers. Riskin
(1982,41) has noted, for example, that "The future of mediation in this
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country rests heavily upon the attitudes and involvement of the legal profession." Further, Riskin (1982,43) points out:
Most lawyers neither understand nor perform mediation nor
have a strong interest in doing either. At least three interrelated
reasons account for this: the way most lawyers as lawyers look
at the world; the economics and structure of contemporary law
practice; and the lack of training in mediation for lawyers.
As a result of factors such as these, law schools, bar associations and
countless other groups are mounting a multitude of eclectic efforts to
inform members of the legal profession about mediation and its relevance
for them. (e.g., see ABA Law School Directory 1983; Sander 1984; Burger
1984).
A third possible explanation for resistance to mediation goes to the central premise of the process itself. In the literature, mediation is often characterized as an empowering process through which the mediator empowers
the parties, particularly the weaker party. This raises questions about whose
side the mediator is on. Colosi (1983, 2) for example, points out that the
"temptation to the mediator to use the mediation process to somehow bring
equity to the dispute by attempting to modify the balance of power is
incredibly strong."
Drawing an analogy between the weaker party and a lamb and the
stronger party and the lion, Colosi (1984, 17) further notes that
When mediators work to empower the lamb, the mediator
may be helpful in that particular case...may help that lamb...they
may help that underdog to prevail and do better than perhaps
the lamb or underdog might have done otherwise, without the
help of the mediator. But there's a danger that the mediation
may earn a negative reputation because of the activities of such
mediators.
Both lion and lamb may simply ask, "What's in it for me?" and refuse
to use the mediation process.
There is one vital distinction between mediators and therapists that
should be underlined pertaining to the "neutral" unbiased stance that each
should have. The therapist's "neutrality" is centered on ethical and moral
issues. In Lewis Wolberg's book, Techniques of Psychotherapy (1977, 137),
the author presents a list of "rules" for building a therapeutic relationship,
one of which is "avoid moralistic judgments." If the patient says, "I get an
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uncontrollable impulse to steal,"unsuitable responses from the therapist are
'That can get you into a lot of trouble,' 'You're going to have to put a stop
to that' or 'That's bad.' The suitable responses listed include: 'Do you have
an idea what's behind this impulse?'; 'How far back does this impulse
go?'; or, 'How does that make you feel?' The point is that the therapist is
neutral, on the patient's side, and nonjudgmental. When this approach is
transferred into group therapy, the same style is employed even when dealing with conflict within the group. The therapist is on the side of the speaker,
and does not make ethical or moral judgments, (e.g., see Levine 1979).
In mediation, "neutrality" is quite different. The mediator is not on anyone's side. Neutrality and impartiality imply not taking sides while stressing recognition of reality and working toward problem solving. (Moore
1986, 15).
This neutrality is not easy to achieve because the mediator's knowledge
of the facts comes from the disputants, who have their own credibility and
their own capacity for persuasiveness. For the mediator to be neutral, facts
must always be credited to their source as that person's account of what is
or what happened. The mediator's task is precisely the opposite of that of
the therapist. The mediator must be seen not to be on one's side and, of
course, not to side with one's opponent. To the comment quoted by Wolberg,
"I get an uncontrollable impulse to steal," the mediator would likely say,
"What would you want to achieve that way?" The mediator could also point
out—to the benefit of all—that there is a difference between an impulse and
an action. Or, the mediator could just ignore the remark. The mediator is
there to advance the process, not to cure any individual, except insofar as
the process may be quasi-therapeutic for the parties.
Unconscious Resistance
Another set of explanations derives from an area not generally part of
mediator training, more specifically psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious. It is obvious that the literal meaning of the term "unconscious" is
"not in consciousness" or outside of our awareness. In developing his ideas
about unconscious thoughts and ideas, Freud went beyond this simple
notion. His first or basic level of meaning of unconscious was, however, at
this descriptive level. It refers to things which we are not aware of—facts,
for example, that arc not "at the tip of the tongue." A friend's phone number might be one such item of knowledge. At first, we may not be able to
recall it; but, with a moment's thought or effort, we can bring it back to
awareness. Items that can be easily brought to consciousness are conceived
of by Freud (1912, 262) as residing in the preconscious system.
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However, there are also memories, ideas and thoughts that are banished
from consciousness, driven underground and not subject to recall under
ordinary circumstances. Painful memories, for example, are repressed from
consciousness and never admitted as long as the repression operates
successfully. This suggests the forceful and energetic nature of ideas not in
consciousness, and it constitutes Freud's dynamic level of meaning.
Finally, as Freud investigated dreams, it became clear to him that the
unconscious was characterized by an ability to condense, displace and distort ideas. These forces were understood by Freud to be dominated by the
wish fulfillment aspects of the pleasure principle and by other aspects of
what he called primary process thinking. Thus, unconscious ideas had their
own system of organization and of process—a notion indicating the systematic meaning of the term unconscious.
These three levels of meaning can be summed up in terms of simple,
direct questions as follows: "What is unconscious?" for the descriptive
level; "Why is it unconscious?" for the dynamic; and "Where is the unconscious idea? How does it operate?" for the systematic level.
How do we know that the unconscious really exists, since, by definition,
no one can attest to their own unconscious. We know it from its manifestations ranging from "forgotten" material that is suddenly remembered,
through slips of the tongue, dreams, ideas that come up during free association, to specific behaviors induced by post-hypnotic suggestion. In this
way, everyone can attest to its reality.
In psychoanalysis, resistance was originally understood to relate to the
tendency of many patients to reject frequently and vigorously offered interpretations. But as attention was drawn to this resistance, therapists also
noticed another level:
Individuals ostensibly seeking psychotherapeutic help were
reported, despite their obvious distress, to carry out various
maneuvers which undermined and sabotaged the therapist's
efforts on their behalf, despite their having consulted the therapist voluntarily, and despite the considerable amounts of money
and time they expended in this search for emotional well-being.
(Singer 1965, 223)
Freud's students and followers, Adler, Jung, Sullivan, Fromm-Reichman,
focused on the notion that resistance is a mechanism in the service of
avoidance, an attempt to keep hidden material that will heighten anxiety
and thereby maintain a sense of personal dignity and continuity rather than
it being a deliberate backward step.
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It is important to remember that resistance reflects the individual's disbelief in alternative ways of living. Holding on to familiar ways, the person fears that any other way of dealing with things will be disastrous and
shattering to self-esteem.
Psychotherapists deal directly and extensively with unconscious resistance, as well as with the nature and style of the relationship between therapist and patient, because contained within them are clues to the very deep
intrapsychic conflicts that must be resolved. Therefore, in a therapeutic situation, resistances must be identified, analyzed and discussed.
The mediator may encounter similar resistances, but extensive analysis
and discussion of them is not crucial to the process. In mediation, the effort
is to help contending parties resolve their differences and come to an amicable agreement. Unconscious resistance is interference, and its nature,
motives and feelings must be understood only in order to overcome its
force as an impediment.
Experienced therapists know that interpretation, clarification and labeling of behavior is appropriate only when the individual comes with a problem, and the road to addressing it involves interpreting the behavior of the
patient. In any other situation, interpretation is uncalled for, and it usually
is experienced as an aggressive attack. For the mediator to interpret behaviors in terms of their unconscious roots—to label some behaviors as resistance, for example—is to risk being perceived as aggressive and hostile.
The mediator should be able to recognize resistance, but be close-mouthed
about interpretation of the resistance.
Recognizing resistance—even if it is not labeled as such—will help in
refusing to tolerate resistant behavior. Thus, if a party in a dispute consistently arrives late for sessions, or leaves early, the mediator should quite
clearly tell the offending party that, by limiting the time to work on a resolution, he or she is slowing down the process rather than helping it along.
If the party offers excuses for the lateness—ascribing it to factors beyond
his or her control—the response could be that the process works only when
the participants make every effort, including planning to arrive early and
giving themselves enough time, so that they do not cut into the time of the
sessions. The discussion focuses on the behavior and its effects, not on its
unconscious purposes.
One relevant psychological insight in understanding resistance to mediation concerns the relationship between resistance and transference.
Transference refers to the transfer of feelings, attitudes and expectations
deriving from other relationships to the situation at hand. Falling in love
with the therapist is one form of transference. Hating the therapist for bigotry, intolerance, and coldness is another, even when the therapist has done
nothing to merit this judgment other than keeping quiet.
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Mediators encounter resistances of a similar sort when resistance to the
process is expressed as a hostile rejection of the mediator. Folberg and
Taylor (1984, 331) point out during negotiation it sometimes occurs that
one of the participants announces that he or she "wishes to withdraw from
mediation because (1) mediation is not working or (2) the mediator is biased
or incompetent." Folberg and Taylor suggest that this resistance can be dealt
with by "legitimizing this announcement before it happens." In the earliest
stages, the participants are told that they have these feelings, that "such a
response is natural," and that the appropriate thing to do is to discuss these
issues in a private caucus or telephone conversation before taking any action.
The essential point is that, in moving forward toward resolution of their
problems, human beings also take backward steps, fearful that movement
will mean unwelcome change. These backward steps are not always deliberate and overt, but may be disguised from detection by the actor. The
mediator must be aware of these forces and their negative effects so that
the tasks of negotiation and mediation can be pursued.
Conscious Resistance
A third set of explanations focuses on conscious resistance, that is resistant activity that the individual is aware of, although not always aware of
its motivations and causes. It usually is found in the interior dialog of individuals. The person says inwardly, for example, "All right, they can make
me appear to cooperate, but there is no way in which they can get me to
do what I don't want to do."
All of us know that we have the capacity to carry on that kind of inner
speech. In fact, when people are engaged in interior dialog in a laboratory
setting, it is possible to monitor electrical changes and subtle muscular
movement in the larynx. (Zemlin 1968, 341). The messages will vary with
the person and the circumstances but the essential point is that the individuals know that their intention is to thwart a particular direction or command rather than comply. This can occur even while the person is
ostensibly committed to a stated agreement.
With the increasingly compulsory nature of mediation, such as mediation in child custody cases, there are several bases for conscious resistance
to the process which arc fueled by specific motivations that the individual
is aware of and consciously expressing.
Most common is simply the novel, unknown nature of mediation. The
disputant, not knowing how mediation works, or perhaps never having even
heard of mediation, fears the unknown and balks at taking part in it.
Mediation is a private process not generally open to public scrutiny, and
may have an image that's even more mystifying than the court process.
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During the initial stage when the disputants are revealing personal positions and interests, some disputants are only able to repeat their general
positions over and over, and, hence have difficulty in saying why they are
insistent on that position.
Another concerns interference with the process as it goes along.
Distracting comments, excessive questioning, or claimed difficulty in comprehending are all behaviors that tend to slow down or completely stop the
process. In multi-session mediations, cancelled appointments and recurrent
lateness may also be indications of possible resistant behaviors.
Furthermore, because mediation encourages parties to work through their
own differences without the assistance of advocates, some disputants are
uncomfortable being in the same room with their adversary without a buffer.
Moreover, the anger and feelings of vindictiveness against the other party as
well as possible stubbornness may make it virtually unable for some to concede a point. Since the emphasis is on individuals working through their
own differences, the selective interpretation of information and feelings that
might otherwise occur if advocates were present is minimized.
Another source of conscious resistance stems from a disputant's reluctance to change the status quo, whether or not a temporary advantage is
being enjoyed. For some people, the mere thought of dealing with unfamiliar conditions often activates anxiety as well as efforts to protect themselves from changes. Hence, it is not uncommon for mediators to
experience a wide range of conscious resistive behaviors, such as: pointed
avoidance of relevant material; dwelling on trivia; reduction of time for
work by being late; making conflicting appointments or completely forgetting appointments; development of symptoms or other emergency problems; or refusal to comply with agreements.
More often than one would want, after the work of mediation is successfully completed and an agreement identified that both parties had a
hand in shaping, one party balks at the very last moment. The latter case
may reflect resistance due to social factors, for it often reflects the influence of others who reject the resolution that the disputant has agreed to.
They may be family members, close friends, or influential, respected third
parties. Not having been part of the mediation, they continue to identify
with the disputants' original position, making it a point of pride, honor,
courage or machismo that the position prevail.
Dealing with Resistance: Suggestions for Mediators
Since mediation tends to be a short-term intervention process, the mediator often does not have an opportunity to handle resistance in a protracted
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manner. Given the many direct and indirect ways in which resistances
surface, as well as the countless intervention modalities, it is not surprising that mediators may experience difficulty in coping with resistance. In
fact, if they anticipate it and are prepared to accept it as a challenge rather
than as a threat, they will be able to creatively work it into the mediation
process. What follows are some suggestions to assist mediators:
• It is essential for mediators to feel secure, competent and comfortable
with the mediation process. Mediators should have both procedural as
well as sufficient substantive knowledge so that they can quickly
recover when unexpected situations arise, to take charge of the mediation process, and to convince ambivalent or uninformed disputants.
Qualities that are important include being able to provide information
about mediation as well as other alternatives and referral sources;
thinking "on one's feet"; and knowing or learning how disputants got
to mediation in the first place. It is equally important that any challenges to the mediator not be taken personally.
• Since many mediators will not be in a position to conduct their own
intake of cases and screen them as they see fit, they may find some of
the disputants would not have been chosen to participate in a mediation session. In some instances, the disputants are overtly reluctant to
participate since they feel that the mediation process was imposed on
them. Mediators need to be careful not to become defensive while
demonstrating that they are about to offer the disputants procedural
assistance. Some disputants could easily question the mediator's competency or authority. Announcing of credentials and/or experience,
establishing rules, providing structure, helping to find alternatives,
and modeling might help alleviate this problem.
• Mediators should also be aware of the fact that they may not be ready
or able to handle certain types of cases due to any number of factors
including areas of personal conflict of interest, personal bias, subject
matter and complexity of the issues to name a few.
• Furthermore, mediators should be alert to the possibility that they
might contribute to resistant behavior through their own verbal or nonverbal communication. For example, mediators may not adequately
encourage disputants to continue with the process, or may not provide
sufficient structure and guidance for the parties to interact with each
other. It is important for mediators to recognize and avoid creating situations that encourage resistant behavior to evolve.
• When resistance is indicated by one of the parties, the mediator needs
to be alert to the possibility that the nonresistant party is trying to
coopt the situation to gain advantage.
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• There are times when the disputants are not ready or able to participate in the mediation process (Haynes 1985, 52) The mediator might
examine why the parties sought out mediation as an intervention process and perhaps even slow down the mediation process so that they
might think through why they are there.
• Some of the resistance demonstrated by the disputants may be the
result of fear of the unknown, lack of knowledge, or even misguided
expectations. For the mediator, then, introductory comments and/or a
contract are often crucial in setting the stage for the mediation process. Useful information is imparted about expectations, roles and
responsibilities for mediator and disputants that may help to reduce
fears.
• At times, disputants may lack the ability or skills to negotiate adequately on their own behalf. A mediator might want to give information, caucus with the parties, or even make referrals.
• For mediators working in some organizations, resistance can be due to
the problems associated with the system's processing of the cases. For
example, disputants may have been delayed, subjected to excessive
paperwork, rescheduled due to personnel shortages, the need for additional information, documentation, witnesses, attorneys, etc. The
mediator should demonstrate empathy, and certainly apologize for the
inconveniences experienced by disputants.

Mediators and Resistance: A Final Word
Because mediation is viewed as a process in which disputants become
engaged voluntarily, mediators may not be prepared to face resistance. In
fact, some would argue that mediation sessions should not be conducted
with resistant parties. The reality is that any intervention process activates
resistance and, when it is not handled effectively, it can be a disruptive
source of discomfort for mediators. Feelings of frustration, sense of failure,
hopelessness, anxiety, resentment, loss of energy, insecurity, fatigue can
result.
For mediators, the key to handling resistance is feeling secure with the
mediation process. The hope would be that mediators, recognizing the significance of resistance to their work, would continue to learn more about
its manifold roots and conceptualization, and work to develop better ways
of recognizing and dealing with it.
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Spousal Violence and Outcome in
Custody and Visitation Mediation
Richard D. Mathis
Flo Whinery
ABSTRACT
To examine whether custody and visitation mediation is appropriate in cases
with a history of spousal violence, the outcomes of 49 self-reported violent couples were compared to those of 29 never-violent couples in court-ordered mediation. Outcomes were not adversely affected significantly except in chronic
cases where incidents had occurred both during the marriage and after separation (p - .011). This report calls for standardized screening to identify chronically violent spouses as well as for modified approaches to treatment of such
cases.

Mediation, an ancient approach to conflict resolution, is now increasingly being applied to the problem of reaching divorce settlements between
spouses who disagree strongly, usually in regard to child custody and visitation. In divorce mediation, instead of litigating in court or negotiating
out of court through lawyers, the spouses meet with an impartial third party
who assists them in reaching a cooperative agreement which is based on
their own decisions and is, theoretically, fairer and better suited to their
family's needs. Often, the divorce courts themselves provide mediators,
who usually have a mental health background (Mclsaac 1982) such as
counseling or social work.Although mediation is growing rapidly as an
38
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alternative to other divorce interventions (Emery & Wyer 1987), a number
of questions have arisen concerning its use in certain circumstances. For
example, the appropriateness of custody and visitation mediation with
spouses who are violent has been questioned emphatically by some nonmediators. Critics have gone so far as to state that either such cases should
never be mediated (Battered Women's Advocates Caucus, 1983; Shaw,
1983), or that mediation is the least desirable of the alternatives to litigation (Lerman 1984).
Others have defended mediation with violent couples as an acceptable
(or even preferred) intervention, provided it includes a combination of special screening and treatment which takes the spousal violence into account
(Bethel & Singer 1982; Davis & Salem 1984; Erickson & McKnight 1988;
Milne & Folberg 1988; Lemmon 1985; Marthaler 1989). This disagreement
appears to be based largely on the question of whether the imbalance of
spousal power which presumably results from violence renders fair negotiations between perpetrator and victim impossible.

Conditional Support for Mediation
However, empirical and clinical evidence from the field suggests fair
negotiation is possible under at least some conditions, even though spousal
violence may have occurred. Several programs which included mediation
of such cases have produced generally acceptable results (Bethel & Singer
1982; Marthaler 1989; Pearson, Thoennes, Mayer, & Golten 1986). Thus,
there is qualified support for custody and visitation mediation with some
types of violent spouses.

Which Cases?
Unfortunately, the literature is not clear about what distinguishes
appropriate cases from inappropriate ones. For example, does it make any
difference in mediation whether the violence is current or limited to the
distant past? Screening is needed, but before enlightened policies for
screening can be set, additional empirical information is needed. This
information should pertain to the frequency with which violent spouses
are able to resolve their disputes in mediation, as well as to which dimensions distinguish the violent spouses who are successful from those who
are not.
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Moreover, better information is needed regarding the true frequency
of cases involving spousal violence in mandated court mediation. For
example, although extreme cases of violence often are identified prior to
mediation, how many cases are there where less extreme spousal violence
escapes casual screening?

Multidimensionality of Spousal Violence
Mediation researchers generally have not distinguished formally between
different levels of spousal violence. However, spousal violence has numerous dimensions which might be important in mediation, including severity,
frequency, setting, mode, cause, recency, history, whether and in what context violence has previously been reported, and whether or not it has been
the subject of prior interventions or is under treatment. Thus, it is important to avoid oversimplification and to recognize the multidimensionality of
spousal violence in mediation. In addition, spousal violence is often accompanied by other symptoms, such as alcohol or drug addiction and individual psychopathologies (Straus & Gelles 1990).
For this exploratory study, spousal violence was conceptualized within
two dimensions: whether, and when it had occurred in the stages of marriage, separation, and divorce. To the subjects, spousal violence was
defined as any physical contact in anger between them. This yielded four
ad hoc classifications of spousal violence based on their timing in the
stages of marriage and divorce: (a) during the marriage only, (b) after separation or divorce only, (c) during marriage and after separation, and (e)
never. These types were labeled "formerly violent," "newly violent,"
"chronically violent," and "never-violent" respectively.

Purpose
Thus, the review of the literature raised the question of whether success
in mandated court mediation between violent spouses was associated with
its recency or its timing relative to the cycle of marriage, separation, and
divorce. To test this, a comparison was made of four groups of spouses who
differed by type from chronically violent to never-violent, according to
whether or not they achieved full, partial, or no resolution. In so doing, the
extent to which spousal violence was present in cases mandated for either
custody and/or visitation mediation was also assessed.
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Method
Subjects
The data for this study were drawn from 84 (N = 168 spouses) cases in
mandatory custody/visitation mediation in a metropolitan family court service. The subjects were recruited serially as they registered for a premediation group orientation. All but two of the couples who participated in
mediation during the recruitment period consented to be subjects in the study.
Instrumentation and Procedure
Both spouses were given a 27-question, non-standardized self-report to
complete separately prior to beginning the premediation orientation. The
questionnaire was primarily intended to provide a better profile of the
clients for the purpose of court-services planning. In addition to its questions about demographics and spousal violence, it asked for reactions to the
premediation orientation and for parental perceptions regarding their children during their divorce. Spousal violence was of special interest due to
informal mediator reports within the agency of what appeared to be a dramatic increase in the frequency with which allegations of the partner's violence arose during mediation sessions. The question was whether this was
a new development in tactics by clients, or whether it was simply a case of
mediation facilitating the disclosure of sensitive new information.
In the design of the questionnaire items on violence, Marthaler's (1989)
warning about the use of overly crude definitions of abuse in working with
clients was heeded. Marthaler found that clients may give misleading information because they are confused by general and seemingly simple questions, such as "Have you ever been abused by your spouse?." This and the
fact that even well-designed self-report paper-and-pcncil survey questions
regarding volatile subjects such as family violence may not be very reliable are two of the limitations of this study.
The surveys were administered by the supervisor, one of the authors of
this study, and collected by the mediators following orientation. The forms
were placed in the case files. Thus, the mediators had access to their
clients' responses to the survey and were free to use the information as
they saw fit. No formal attempt was made to assess how, or if, this information was used during mediation, nor were the mediators asked to confirm whether they thought the data were correct. As cases closed, the
mediators assessed their outcomes in terms of full, partial, or no resolution.
These terms were defined, respectively, as either: (a) a written agreement
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covering the major issues, and intended to be entered in court, (b) some
agreement, or movement, on major issues relating to custody and/or visitation, or (c) no meaningful progress at all.
Case assignments were made non-selectively except where the supervisor was aware of or suspected problems that might call for a mediator with
expertise in a particular area, such as bilingualism. Of the nine mediators
who participated in the study, seven were women, two were black, one was
Hispanic, and another was bilingual.

Results
Characteristics of the Sample
As Table 1 shows, two-thirds of the cases were for divorces and the
remainder was for modification of existing agreements between already
divorced spouses. Demographically, members of the sample were largely in
their late twenties to late thirties (86.9%), Anglo white (70.3%), educated
(58.0% with at least some college), and middle-income (61.5%).
Table 2 contains a breakdown of the types of spousal violence reported
by the subjects. Nearly two-thirds of the couples in the sample reported
spousal violence had occurred sometime during the marriage, separation,
and/or divorce. Of these, the majority reported that violence had occurred
during marriage but not after separation (the type designated here as "formerly violent"). Nevertheless, nearly one-in-five of the total sample
(17.9%) reported they had been violent both during marriage and after separation (the 'chronically violent' type). Chi square tests showed spousal
violence was not significantly associated with any of the demographic variables that were measured.
Wives' versus Husbands' Self-Reports The wives' reports were used to
assess the level of violence because they were more likely to report it than
were husbands, presumably because they were most often the victims.
Husbands were more likely to report lower levels of violence or none at
all. However, most husbands and wives agreed (68.0%) in their reports of
violence. Where there was disagreement between spouses, it was usually
the husband who minimized the extent of the violence. Although the subjects were not asked to identify the perpetrator or the victim, one husband
reported being the object of spousal violence, but he added that he also was
a perpetrator himself.
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Table 1.
Sample Characteristics
Variable

n

valid %

Cumulative %

Case type
Divorce
Modification"

56
28

66.7
33.3

100.0

Spouse
Husband
Wife

82
84

49.4
50.6

100.0

66
73
21

41.3
45.6
13.1

86.9
100.0

Age
Less than 32
33-40
More than 41
No report

6

Income (in thousands of dollars)
Less than 10
> 10 < 25
> 25 < 40
> 40
No report

39
61
33
21
6

25.0
39.1
22.4
13.5

64.1
86.5
100.0

Race
Black
White (Anglo)
Other
No report

22
111
25
8

13.9
70.3
15.8

100.0

Education
Up to H.S. graduate
Some college
College degree +
No report

67
52
40
7

42.2
32.7
25.3

74.7
100.0

* Modification: The already-divorced spouses return to court in a dispute over the custody
and/or visitation terms of the existing divorce agreement.
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Table 2.
Types of Spousal Violence Based on Wives' Reports for 84 Couples
Entering Mandated Custody/Visitation Mediation
Group
Formerly violent
(during marriage only)
Newly violent
(after separation only)
Chronically violent
(both during marriage and after separation)
Never violent
(no violence or physical contact from anger)
Total
No report
a
b

n

%a

27

34.6

8

10.3

14

17.9

29

37.2

84
6

100.0
7.1b

percentage of cases reporting.
percentage of all cases.

Mediator Differences
The mediators varied in their case contribution from as few as four up
to fifteen cases apiece. Chi square analysis in the three cases where the n
was sufficiently large to make testing feasible, revealed no significant differences between mediators based on the outcomes they produced.
Outcomes
Overall, the sample achieved full resolution in exactly half of all the
cases. This is in line with rates reported for other similar court-mediation
services. Chi square analysis was used to compare each of the violent subgroups against the never-violent group, 55% of which achieved full resolution. As Table 3 shows, these chi square values indicated that no
significant differences existed between the formerly violent and the newly
violent versus the never-violent couples, but a significant difference did
exist between the chronically violent versus never-violent couples (X2
(2) = 8.54, p = .014). Even though the sample was sizable, when three levels of outcome were used, some of the expected cell frequencies in the chi
square analysis were less than five, meaning the statistic was questionable.
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Thus, the partial and no-resolution groups were collapsed together to
achieve cell frequencies of adequate size. This had no effect on the results
of the tests. The chi square statistic for both levels of outcome is reported
in Table 3.
Examination of the observed outcome frequencies (Table 3) revealed
that a majority of the formerly violent couples achieved full resolution. The
newly violent couples as a group were very successful, with an even better
rate of success than the never-violent group. Conversely, only one-in-five
of the chronically violent group reached full agreement. Thus, all four
types of violence groups were generally in balance with each other, except
the chronically violent, which was extremely over represented in the partial and especially in the no-resolution classifications.
Conclusions
The evidence indicates that, contrary to the idea that mediation is never
appropriate in such cases, spousal violence does not necessarily preclude
Table 3.
Observed Frequencies and Chi Square Values for Outcome by Violence
for 49 Violent Couples versus 29 Never-violent Couples
in Child Custody/Visitation Mediation

Subject group (n)

Resolution group
Full
Part None

Formerly violent (27)
Percentages
Newly violent (8)
Percentages
Chronically violent (14)
Percentages
Never violent (29)
Percentages
Total (84)
Total percentages

14
52%
5
63%
3
21%
16
55%
42
50%

a

3
11%
0
0%
3
21%
2
7%
8
10%

10
37%
3
37%
8
57%
11
38%
34
40%

X2 (df)
.12(1)
.76(2)
.17(1)
no test
6.45(1)
8.54(2)
—

p

.729"
.686b
.677a
c
.011a
.014 b
—

Computed for two levels of outcome with partial and no-resolution groups combined.
Computed for three levels of outcome with some expected cell frequencies less than five.
c
Only two outcome levels observed.
b
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successful mediation. Specifically, mediation appears to work normally in
most custody/visitation cases with a history of spousal violence except
those where the violence has occurred throughout the marriage, separation,
and divorce cycle—the type which has been labeled "chronic" in this study.
This general lack of success in chronic cases suggests either modified
mediation or an alternative intervention is necessary. For example, alternatives might be prosecution or counseling, or, as Bethel and Singer (1982)
recommended, an integrated multiple treatment program of which mediation is a component. Along the same lines, Pearson, Thoennes, Mayer, and
Golten (1986) have also stressed that mediation in custody/visitation cases
with spousal violence occurs within a divorce system, and that mediation
does not stand alone as an intervention. This means mediators working
with violent spouses should be aware of the resources available to them in
other agencies and be prepared to employ them.
Because the extent (if any) to which the mediators in the study changed
their treatment on the basis of information they noted in the survey was not
assessed, it is not known how the results were affected, if at all. Future
studies should better assess and control for this treatment variable.
A primary question raised by these results is why formerly and newly
violent spouses fared so well compared to the chronically violent. Even
though violence between newly violent spouses might have been recent, or
even current, it did not seem to inhibit mediation. Perhaps this is because
it was perceived by the participants as being merely situational (unique to
the separation process). Thus, the couple would not behave in mediation as
if spousal violence were built-into the dynamics of power, conflict management, and negotiation of the spousal/family system. On the other hand,
as Isaacs, Montalvo, and Abelsohn (1986) have observed, chronic violence
may become so integral to the spousal/family system that mediation would
almost certainly fail because it would require a fundamental (second order)
change in family functioning. Similarly, the formerly violent (those where
there had been no post-separation violence) might have developed methods
of controlling violence during marriage prior to separation, so that it had
not become so built-in as to affect mediation. This means the effects of present spousal violence in mediation likely depend on whether it was integrated into the spousal/family system in the past.
From the finding that two-thirds of the cases involved histories of
spousal violence, it is apparent that screening should be considered as a
prerequisite to sound practice. To accomplish this, mediators should adopt
a multidimensional perspective on spousal violence similar to the approach
advocated by Nelson (1989) for understanding the relationship between
parental hostility, conflict, and communication in joint- and sole-custody
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families. Such an approach would be sensitive to the distinctions between
past patterns of violence (from the marriage), present patterns (in the
separation/divorce adjustment phase), and future patterns (post-divorce)
which might be fostered by the very design—custody, visitation, logistics—of the mediated agreement. First, however, an acceptable, multidimensional definition of spousal violence that is more suitable for mediation
is also needed.
Although it is clear that chronic (or extreme) cases of spousal violence
require modified treatment, what about cases which are not extreme—or
where violence may only be considered by the clients to be peripheral to
more important issues? Additional research is needed to determine whether,
or how, the less extreme cases actually differ from non-violent cases, as
well as whether special mediation and/or follow-up might be called for. For
example, is full resolution between violent spouses as valid as full resolution between the non-violent? In this regard, Pearson, Thoennes, Mayer,
and Golten (1986) found compliance rates for violent spouses were lower,
indicating agreements between violent spouses may be less valid. Research
is also needed on whether agreements reached between chronically violent
spouses, though few in number, are as fair as non-chronically violent
agreements.
Finally, the seeming candor with which the subjects reported spousal
violence in their marriages was impressive. The fact that most husbands
backed up their wives in reporting violence (although sometimes they
reported lesser degrees) indicates that allegations or even hints of spousal
violence should never be dismissed lightly as mere negotiating ploys. A
standardized self-report questionnaire covering spousal violence is needed,
and these findings suggest that paper-and-pencil self-reports for premediation assessment would work well. Combined with more systematic mediator assessment of violence in the initial interviews, such an instrument
should dramatically improve the present effectiveness of premediation
screening. The high incidence of spousal violence uncovered in this study
is a red flag that all cases should be screened as a matter of routine practice. In addition to a more standardized method of screening, guidelines for
modified treatment strategies arc needed in cases where spousal violence
has occurred.
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In the Shadow of Best Interest:
Negotiating the Facts, Interests, and
Interventions in Child Abuse Cases

Gene Kassebaum
David B. Chandler
ABSTRACT
Most cases of child abuse and neglect are not as extreme or clear-cut as those
reported in the media. In routine cases the perpetrator is usually a family member, the evidence of injury is ambiguous and the identity of the perpetrator is
uncertain. Prosecution, removal of the child, and therapy for the family are
sometimes contradictory mandates which courts and social service agencies
must balance.
Norm centered negotiation is the decision making process found in this study of
child protective work. Child protection workers sometimes negotiate with families in their decisions to confirm abuse, representatives of different agencies
negotiate with each other to establish the facts of a case, the best interests of
the child, and the service plan. Negotiation is interpreted to be a practical solution to chronic factual uncertainly, contradictory mandates and multi-agency
participation in decisions.
Recognition and legitimation of negotiation as the actual decision making pro
cess in many cases will permit agencies to keep records and data which permit
mure adequate monitoring of case processing Legitimation of negotiation will
permit explicit training of staff in more effective methods to negotiate in the
shadow of the best interests of children
49
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Introduction: Child Abuse As a Social Problem

There is dramatic symbolism in the imagery of a playground marauder
or day care center employee who molests children. Public reaction to these
widely reported cases is swift and uncompromising. Offenders are to be
prosecuted and severely punished. Court procedures which seem to impede
prosecution or inhibit the testimony of child victims are easily criticized.
There is little public sympathy for the rights of the accused and much public concern for the victim.
Child abuse (physical battery, sexual exploitation, or gross neglect) has
become a social issue (Nelson 1984). Recent improvements in the public
consciousness of the pervasiveness and severity of domestic violence has
led to action. New child protective laws and increases in the reporting of
abuse have intensified the demands on state, municipal, and family courts
for vigorous prosecution and on social agencies for expeditious intervention to protect children.
However, for every child that is a victim in a highly publicized case in
which the villainy and the villain are known, there are hundreds who live
in more ambiguous situations. Their danger is less obvious and interventions to protect them are not clear. While expeditious decisions and an
emphasis on safety characterize the new laws and agency policies, they
also reflect the realities of handling large numbers of heterogeneous and
ambiguous cases.
By every estimate most child abusers are members of the family. For
these cases, laws and policies emphasize the interests of the child over criminal prosecution. Balancing these two objectives is difficult and controversial. There is a strongly expressed and extensive argument that the
preservation and reunification of the family is in the child's best interests.
The reasoning is that even a problematic family is better for child development than the loss of family (Goldstein, Freud, & Solnit 1973; Wald 1980).
On the other hand, public concerns for lowering the risk of danger to
children, and deterring abusers require holding ready or using the coercive
power of the law to remove children and to criminalize abusive conduct.
Some criticize child protection agencies and family courts for the low rate
of prosecution of family members as dereliction of the duty to protect and
deter, or as simple inefficiency.
There are three models of intervention in child abuse cases that have
been advocated historically. However, in this study of child abuse case processing, a negotiation model was found to typify the working style of crisis social workers and other professionals.
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The Prosecutorial Model
In the past, police and prosecutors were reluctant to make arrests within
violent families. Such arrests were thought to be unproductive because of
witness failure and the possible provocation of further violence by the
offender upon return to the family. But the justice model has recently
gained credibility through the well-advertised study of Sherman and Berk
(1984), which argues that arrest in spouse abuse cases produced lower reabuse rates than two other non-arrest options (Sherman & Berk 1984; Berk
& Newton 1985).
However, child abuse cases within families are infrequently prosecuted.
Absence of clear and dependable testimony from a first-hand witness is
still a major factor in the low rates of prosecuting child abuse. Abused children are an extreme type of "situational" victim. The experiences of these
crime victims shows that they are beset by problems which are not solved
by an arrest or even a conviction. These situational victims are caught in a
context which exposes them to continual or episodic contact with an
offender. This contact in turn results in repeated injury, harassment, or
avoidance costs. Effective escape is precluded and inhibits them or their
family allies from pressing for prosecution. For abused children the privacy
of the home, the extremity of dependency, and power differences may drastically reduce any gains brought about by prosecution. While the prosecution model seeks and may achieve some deterrence effect, the costs born
by the victim may be considerable.
The Clinical Model
The clinical model seeks to deliver effective services to victims and
offenders. Psychological, psychiatric or social work case services are
intended to restore the victims and protect them from further abuse by
rehabilitating the offender, or restructuring the family situation. The full
medical-case work model is brought into play in some cases, but is
restricted by the high cost of trained clinical personnel and the number of
cases in which the client resists seeking or accepting help.
Poor parenting skills, alcohol and drug use, and other treatable problems
may be assessed as the basis for abuse or neglect. Family members may be
receptive and participate in programs or services. But the time required for
the achievement of treatment effects even in a favorable situation may
leave the child victim at unacceptable risk during the treatment process.
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Clinical models apply professional and technical expertise to human
problems. They work best when there are clear diagnostic and treatmentresponse criteria. In a review of eleven child maltreatment programs,
however
[there is] little consensus in the field on what constitutes quality [of case management]...since we are still in the midst of
debates about some of the dynamics of child abuse and
neglect...it is difficult to judge with confidence how well
various services are being delivered and the adequacy with
which certain functions are being carried out. (Cohn & Miller
1977, 457)

The Child Saving Model
"Child saving" emphasizes the removal and rescue of a neglected or
abused child over criminal prosecution and clinical intervention. Its current
revival dates from the publication of the well-known "battered child syndrome," and is an ideological animus to much of the thinking and practice
in child abuse. However, child protective laws, while establishing the legal
right to rescue, also prescribe limits to the removal of a child from the
home. There are various rationales for these legal limits. One is the orthodox psychoanalytic conviction that disruption of parent-child bonds is
inevitably disturbing to child development. A second is the advocacy of the
child's rights to a place in his or her family. A third is the liberal defense
of rights or citizens against the coercive power of the State. A fourth is the
practical possibility of a subsequent civil action by someone too quickly or
falsely accused of child abuse.
While rarely articulated, an additional reason for limitations to the
removal of children, is the foster home problem. There is a relatively high
risk of continued problems when a child is placed in a series of foster care
homes. Reliable studies of the results of foster care suggest that the quality of supervision is often substandard, that reabuse upon return to the original family is high, and that the sheer unavailability of foster homes limit
its use (Block & Libowitz 1983; Wald, Carlsmith, Leiderman, deSales
French, & Smith 1985).
The three models separate the principle approaches to abuse for a clearer
description and understanding. However, real life agencies and professionals
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mix and use elements of all models. The models coexist as a basis and
rationale for decision making in most child abuse cases.
The severity of abuse and the clarity of the facts are two case attributes
which also help reveal how decisions are made. In the many confirmed
cases where abuse is not severe, social workers process cases unilaterally.
In these "minor" cases, families often agree to intervention, accept counseling and other supports to keep the family relatively intact and perhaps
even improve the family climate for children. If families cooperate and permit intervention and closer supervision, the clarity of the facts become less
important.
A small number of cases are not treated as minor. They have one or more
of the following features. Injuries may be visible, and in a few cases, serious. The facts on injuries may be unclear or inconsistent. Even with clear
facts showing the presence of abuse or neglect, the source and perpetrator
may remain uncertain. Victimization is severe or chronic. Families do not
cooperate, or appear only marginally competent to participate in treatment.
The prosecution of the offender or removal of children is contemplated, usually against family wishes. In these cases efforts to establish more certainty
in the facts are made, often unsuccessfully. Thus, decision making is difficult, and usually involves several professionals in different agencies.
Research Questions
Decisions made by professionals in their processing of child abuse cases
is the subject of this study. We seek to understand the processes by which
decisions are made, by whom and on what basis. Three analytically distinct
decision points in these cases are isolated: confirming that real abuse
exists, identifying the best interests of the child (usually seen in a remove
or return to family decision), and fashioning a service plan for the family.
Data Sources
There are three data sources used in this study. Statistics on cases of
reported child abuse received by a large state child protection agency were
reviewed. In-depth field interviews with all child protection workers in the
intake unit of the same agency were conducted and analyzed. Observations
and field notes from 16 case conferences involving over 45 children were
studied. Informal observations and conversations with social workers,
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attorneys, and court personnel were also helpful in understanding decision
processes. These constitute the empirical basis of this report.
Results
The agency annual report describes 1,852 complaints of child abuse or
neglect. Slightly less than half of these (47.3percent) were confirmed.
According to state law, all abuse complaints must be investigated and
either confirmed or not confirmed. Both are entered into the data base and
even non-confirmed complaints may affect decisions on the family if a subsequent complaint is received. According to the CPS workers and their
supervisors:
Confirmed means, based on the evidence, that the abuse or
neglect occurred. It confirms the report made. The allegations
must be specific, that is, a child was hit with a stick or
belt...with threatened harm a child may [also] be removed. The
profile of the parents and the family history (drug abuse, leaves
the children unsupervised, teenage mother) may influence decisions. A case is considered confirmed if parents admit to the
abuse. A case can be confirmed on basis of statements of child
[if old enough] or sources such as medical reports, psychologists reports, police records, military police records. (Field
Interviews)
To confirm neglect, the social worker will look at the family history, talk
to neighbors and relatives and try to get a pattern. Before making a decision to confirm, the social worker will consult with any medical doctors,
therapist or school personnel who might have information about the case.
The agency uses a multi-disciplinary team for social worker consultation
about the facts of the case. The team consists of a psychologist, medical
doctor, social worker, nurse and deputy attorney general. The team's recommendations are not binding.
Another social worker said in some cases she will bargain with the parents over the issue of confirmation. This was more frequent with military
parents, primarily because active duty military personnel are closely supervised and are subject to punishment on such a complaint. Rather than confirm abuse, this social worker will designate the family as "high risk" if the
family will cooperate and actively participate in a service plan. The social
worker then monitors the case and works with the military liaison person.
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Two Styles of Confirming Abuse
All agency workers stressed that in the small number of cases where
there was willful abuse producing tangible injury or where there was evidence of clear danger to the child, they invariably confirmed the complaint.
However, there appear to be two patterns among workers in deciding on
whether or when to confirm in the more ambiguous cases. In the first pattern, if, upon investigation, abuse is strongly suspected but injury is minor
and if the family is cooperative and caretakers indicate willingness to
accept services on a voluntary basis, the social worker may decide not to
confirm. If the family is uncooperative, the worker may confirm the case
and take the case to court to impose an intervention. Explicit discussion of
these two options with the family may result in a decision by the family to
cooperate. In this pattern, confirmation is negotiated. In the second pattern,
however, some social workers stated that they confirmed any case on the
basis of evidence, regardless of family attitude. But if the family immediately complied with a written contract and treatment plan, the case could
be reevaluated and closed. If the family voluntarily agrees to a service plan
but then does not comply, the Department can take the case to Family
Court and seek to get services court ordered. In the first pattern, confirmation is immediately negotiated; in the second pattern, confirmation is
not negotiated, but the status of the case will be negotiated at a later time.
In both cases, the child protective worker acts to increase their influence
in negotiations with the family.

Removal of the Child
In about 25 percent of the confirmed abuse cases, and 20 percent of the
confirmed neglect cases, children were removed from the home for some
period. In about 7 percent of non-confirmed complaints, children were also
removed, however, only 4 out of 55 removals were court ordered. The
remaining were out-placements arranged with the "voluntary" consent of
the family. The rate of court ordered removal was much higher for confirmed abuse or neglect cases, but overall about three times as many children arc removed by "voluntary" actions as by court order.
The seriousness of injury increases the likelihood of removal. For children with internal injuries, fractures, concussions, and severe psychological abuse, removal rates were 40 percent to 50 percent, compared with 8
percent for cases without such injuries. Older children (above 11 years, and
especially those above 13) and children in "common law" or divorced
households also arc more likely to be removed.
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The Decision to Remove the Child from the Home

The law empowers the child protection agency to remove a child if there
is need for treatment, imminent threat, or probable cause to believe abuse
will occur.
In a remove/not remove decision, the case worker will look at
imminent harm...the child has been harmed and it is likely the
child will be harmed again. Or, if the child hasn't been harmed
but the profile is so risky that it appears the child will be
harmed.
Items in a remove/not remove decision include: parents' expectations of the children (are they age appropriate?), characteristics of parents (particularly mental status), previous record.
Information is gathered from neighbors, police, the person who
made complaint, and social workers' observation of the parents'
attitude toward the child. (Field Interviews)
Negotiation may occur when a worker seeks police assistance to remove
a child. Sometimes the social worker can talk the parents into voluntary
placement of the child and the social worker can then remove the child.
According to one social worker, the judgment of the police officer often
enters into the removal decision. During the day the social worker can
phone the lieutenant in the police juvenile division to order an officer to
remove a child. But at night, sometimes the police will not agree to remove
the child. The social worker is told to "talk as fast as you can" to convince
the officer to remove the child. If the worker fails to convince the police,
they can talk to the parents to try to get them to release the child. A court
order is the worker's last option and gets such a hearing within 48 hours.
With military families, M.P.'s can remove and place the child in a Federal
hospital for a workup. The agency worker can get a court order to take the
child from the hospital when abuse is confirmed.
Return after removal also may involve negotiation. Our interviews indicate case workers used the option of return in connection with family cooperation with the service plan. The social worker sometimes bargains with
the parents' attorney to get the family to "stipulate" in order to avoid a
contested hearing. The leverage the social worker often uses is that if the
family will cooperate with the services, the child can go home.
Bargaining sometimes takes place with regard to criminal charges, especially where the evidence is known to be weak. If the family will cooperate, criminal charges may be dropped. This happens most often in cases of
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sexual abuse, and is justified as "more effective protection" (Field interviews). While there were approximately 200 children removed during the
research year, only about 50 were removed by court order. The child protective workers negotiate with families under a shadow of potential court
ordered removal. Of course, the court does not always remove a child when
the worker requests it. But the threat is credible.

The Case Conference
Much of the information gathering and decision making in child abuse
work is done on the telephone between pairs of people. Sometimes informal face-to-face conferences occur over cases. Most of this work seems to
be handled routinely. But cases in which the facts and interventions are not
clear arc processed in a more formal case conference. It is the setting in
which the "factual" basis for an assessment is developed and a course of
action may be determined.
We observed sixteen conferences, each lasting about 2 hours and usually
dealing with three cases. They were routinely scheduled each week and
were usually held in a hospital meeting room. The pediatrician (P) presided,
and the typical attendees were a pediatric nurse (PN) with training in child
abuse, a mental health professional, usually a psychologist (PSY), the CPS
worker (W) who presented the case, the worker's supervisor (S), a lawyer
(L) retained to advise the conference, and a psychology student note taker.
Frequently, there were other social workers who had contact with the family, public health nurses, school counselors, and special education teachers.
In a typical conference, the case worker would begin by describing the
abuse or neglect report, the information which was gathered to date and the
actions that had been taken. They would identify one or more uncertainties
in the case which was the reason for the conference. Usually the pediatrician would follow with a very short description of the medical history and
diagnosis of any injuries. Frequently, the lawyer would be questioning the
pediatrician about any injuries and exchanges among the group would follow. A typical example follows:
L
P
L
P
L

"Any previous injuries?"
"No."
"None?"
"None on the pictures (x rays) or in our records."
"What caused the arm?" (A fractured bone in the upper arm of a
4-year-old boy.)
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P
S
L
P

"He said his brother."
"The father says he fell."
"Could he have fallen?"
"It's a fracture that comes from twisting, not likely in a fall, usually a strong person has to do it."
L
"For sure?"
P
"75 percent"
L
"That's good enough for me, but maybe not for Judge
, he
used to defend these people."
PN
"Is he hearing the petitions this month?"
P
"I don't think we are at that point yet. (To the PSY) Have you done
your work-up yet?"
PSY
"Sort of. The family is borderline. Mom is real needy but is hanging in there. A few scores are pretty good."
S
"How's father?"
PSY
"Doesn't like all the attention, but I don't see anything serious...
drinks a fair amount."
W
"He hasn't cooperated much."
L
"Anyone know who did it? Brother or father?"
OBSERVATION: No response to L's question. Shrugging of shoulders, raising of eyebrows.
L
"Well, we could get 'em on neglect. They let someone do it."
P
"What are the other options?"
W
"Mom is willing to do almost anything."
PN
"What about temporary placement?"
S
"Low priority. We could do it but not immediately. I don't think
it's indicated yet."
P
"If it was, how soon could you get him in?"
S
"Immediately, if he was in danger. Four months to get him into a
good one."
PN
"I'm worried about this kid. Is he safe if we leave him?"
L
"If it's Dad, can Mom stop it?"
After approximately 40 minutes of similar dialogue, the pediatrician
summarized what he described as a "tentative consensus" that the child
would remain in the family with close supervision by the CPS worker until
both the father and mother were involved in one of several potential counseling services. No one dissented, and there was resigned agreement with
such phrases as "nothing else looks practical."
At this and other case conferences, the pediatrician performed the role
of mediator by calling on different people, diverting premature decision
making, checking the quality of factual assessments, and the practicality of
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interventions. The pediatrician also modeled brevity and grounded explanations in his discourse.
The lawyer was usually active early in the discussions on the factual
basis for any legal action, and on the practical problems presented by the
reputations of judges who would hear the case and lawyers who represented
the parents. While less involved in discussion of the types of intervention,
the lawyer was knowledgeable on entitlements and insurance benefits
which she often contributed to the frequent discussions of how various
counseling services could be financed.
The CPS supervisor often resisted the removal of children to foster homes
more than most others at the conference. He articulated the philosophy of
keeping a home intact and sometimes stated that getting and keeping foster
parents was very difficult. During one conference over a pair of early teenage
girls who were running away from home, he states, "These are the kinds of
kids who use up foster homes. After they run away several times or try to
burn down the garage, we have a helluva time keeping the foster parents."
If the conference seemed to move toward a consensus to remove a child,
they would often return to the typical early discussion in which the information base for the abuse or neglect was discussed. When tangible and
observable injuries were not available, the discussion would try to ferret
out other bases for a justification to intervene.
PSY
PHN

"Has anyone seen any bonding?"
"Not recently, but last year I was working with them on managing
ear infections and I noticed the little girl go to her mother voluntarily several times.

These conferences are one important venue for interagency decision
making about the nature and quality of facts present in a case, the desirability and practicality of invoking a legal intervention, and the availability and financing of interventions in child abuse cases. These conferences
are a form of mediated negotiations between various professionals with
access to different forms of information and influenced by different organizational and philosophic interests. They also collectivize responsibility
for decisions for which there is a high level of uncertainty and potentially
serious consequences.
Summary

Two types of negotiation were commonly observed:
1. negotiating a working conception of the facts of the case from
fallible or contested sources;
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2. negotiating a course of action between opposed interests of the partics to the dispute, including the State.
These varieties of negotiation are brought into play at three phases of
case disposition:
1. to confirm the complaint of abuse and determine if an abusive risk
exists;
2. to identify if the risk and the best interests of the child justify removal
of the child from the home;
3. to achieve an effective disposition or resolution of the case, including
an adequate, acceptable, and enforceable service plan, and long-term
placement of the victim within or outside the original family.

Discussion
Decision Making
As of 1985, Michael Wald et al. could still write:
The terms abuse and neglect have no agreed upon definition.
(See also Zieglcr 1980.) Child protection agencies become
involved in abuse cases ranging from brutally beaten children
with broken bones to children who suffered spankings by hand
without visible injuries. Neglect cases are even more diverse.
Adding to the complexities many cases involve a mixture of
abuse and neglect.... Moreover...one [may] take into account a
variety of factors which may be related to how seriously we
should view the need for intervention, such as the actual or
potential severity of injuries, the parents' menial state at the
time of the incident, the presence or absence of a history of
abuse or neglect and the receptiveness to intervention of the
parent.... Giovannoni and Beccera (1979) found professionals
from different disciplines which deal with abuse and neglect
cases differ substantially when rating the seriousness of various
forms of abuse and neglect. (Wald 1985, 37-40)
In the Stanford study, Wald et al. observe that
determining re-abuse or continued neglect is difficult. While
some conduct clearly constitutes either abuse or neglect, nor all
physical harm to the child or parental inattention equals abuse
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or neglect, at least for purposes of permitting state intervention.... We must draw some fine lines. (1985, 87).
In a study of English, multi-agency responsibilities in child abuse cases
raises questions of coordination and decision making, Dingwall, Eekelaar,
and Murray (1983) concluded that agencies face major difficulties in
reviewing case handling, enforcing standards and implementing policies.
Careful descriptions show how agency personnel deal with factual uncertainty and inconsistent agency mandates. Their detailed analysis of a case
conference concerning an injured child is illustrative of the negotiated
basis of child protective decisions, which they describe as a
clash between the medical model of the conference as an occasion for information to be collected and decisions delegated
under a doctor's orchestration, and social services' view of the
conference as an occasion for them to listen to discussion and
take advice in the course of forming their decision. (Dingwall
et al. 1983, 153)

Public Concerns and Decision Making
The decisions made by agencies and courts in cases of child abuse have
been criticized from the three perspectives— justice, clinical, and child
saving—described at the beginning of this article. Hageman (1985) reports
similar distinctions in work with child sexual abuse.
There are elements of casework, child saving and prosecution models in
case disposition, but as overall characterizations each of these is incomplete if applied to the way organizations process child abuse cases to a
final disposition. Thinking of the process as clinical casework exaggerates
the degree to which a client-professional relationship can be maintained in
contested situations. Thinking of it as child saving, overestimates the frequency with which families are reconstituted or children permanently relocated. Thinking of it as law enforcement ignores the small proportion of
cases which result in prosecution or conviction. Each is a partial view from
a different professional perspective. We found elements of all models in each
case, but with variable emphasis. As a normative model each may appeal to
the predispositions of advocates and theorists. As a descriptive model of the
process, none were adequate. They did not help us to understand the
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processes we observed, the basis of the decisions and the behavior of the
participants.
No model satisfies public expectations of straightforward social control.
This makes it difficult to mobilize public support for a realistic approach
to services, to legislate realistic policies and explicitly train staff in some
of the skills they will actually need to do their job. Moreover, it results in
record systems which do not document important steps in case disposition.
This in turn inhibits evaluation of the effects of various intervention strategies on the short or long term status of the victim (Chiles 1979; Conte &
Berliner 1985; Fanschel and Shinn 1978; Mnookin 1973; Runyan, Gould,
Tost, & Loda 1981; Stein & Rzepnicki 1983; Taw 1979; Wald 1980).
Knowledge of the complexities in the consequence of removing children
from abusive homes is increasing. Some find that foster care is generally
beneficial. Wald et al. (1985) presents data demonstrating that foster care
can protect children from further abuse in most instances (see Bolton,
Laner, & Gia 1981). Lemmon's research shows that children in foster care
do not have especially low self esteem or an unfavorable self concept
(Wald et al. 1985). Others have found that children in foster care fared better than they had with their parents.
The work of Block and Libowitz (1983) establishes the second side of
the remove-return decision: many children who are returned to their family are subsequently removed again either by authorities or parents because
of resurgence of the original abuse or problem, or because of a new problem. Others report that foster children do not have a high repeat return rate
after they are returned to the family, nor a high delinquency rate (Runyan
1985). In very serious cases in which parental rights are terminated,
Borgman reports that involuntary termination caused more serious problems for the child than it solved (1981, 402).
Research Issues in Negotiation

Negotiation is a ubiquitous part of social life. Some even say
that social order itself is a negotiated phenomenon. Yet the
study of negotiation as an actual discourse activity, occurring
between people who have substantial interests and tasks in the
real social world, is in its infancy. (Maynard 1984, vii)
Maynard was writing of prosecutors and public defenders in criminal
cases, but his ideas may apply to many inter-agency case-based decisions.
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The reconceptualization of the model of case disposition as a type of
dispute negotiation is useful but may be controversial. Negotiation is conventionally viewed as a norm-free process involving power, bluff, and an
imperative to compromise. This image is appropriate for business transactions but hardly for deciding the fate of a helpless child.
Negotiation is sometimes viewed as an unfortunate but necessary accommodation to practical problems. In Maynard's path breaking study of plea
bargaining in a misdemeanor court he says
Plea bargaining is often depicted as a response to such outside
factors as overcrowding in the courts...[but he]...views plea bargaining not as reaction but as participants enaction of taken-forgranted discourse and negotiation skills...derived from
practitioners own cultural knowledge and praxis rather than
from outside social pressures. (1984, 2)
Negotiation research reveals a wide variety of negotiation types.
Eisenberg's "norm centered model of dispute negotiation," which emphasizes that negotiation outcomes are heavily influenced by the principles,
rules, and ethics that are invoked by the negotiating parties, is a useful conception of what we saw in child abuse processing (Eisenberg 1976).
To be sure in the agency we studied, practical questions were part of
child abuse negotiated decision making. Docs the factual evidence reach
the level of "probable cause"? How will interventions be financed? Does
this child need a scarce foster home placement more than some others?
These concerns were discussed openly but not to the exclusion of safety
and best interest. These two principles were the omnipresent shadow under
which negotiations were conducted.
Our observations on how child abuse cases are negotiated in reality fit
with research on disposition and settlement in regulatory agencies and in
criminal prosecution. The process of working with child abuse cases as
negotiation is essentially an empirical, descriptive judgment. As in studies
of plea bargaining in criminal cases, there are policy questions to be raised.
While research may establish that plea bargaining is a common feature in
criminal court processing of cases, it is an evaluation question to what
extent and under what conditions plea bargaining is consistent with the
interests of justice, the protection of the community, and the constitutional
rights of a defendant. Winter, in his analysis of the day-to-day enforcement
of Federal Environmental Protection laws by the E.P.A., has described
agency work as "barter" with the manufacturers, but wonders if "newly
articulated justifications for bartering rationality may...tend to legitimate
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and promote a longstanding disguise for thwarting the popular will"
(Winter 1985, 248).
This research is similar in findings and implications. Professionals seem
to use negotiation to cope with cognitive uncertainty, program resource
limitations, conflicting mandates, and clashes between opposing interests
of parties to the case. There are analytic and practical advantages to explicitly conceptualizing it in this way rather than as clinical or justice decision
making. One is to promote a more searching and realistic evaluation of the
consequences of intervention and the extension of protection and services
to an important type of victim.
Studying the disposition of child abuse cases from the standpoint of
negotiation may promote better understanding of the issues faced by agencies and could facilitate the development of information systems and evaluations to better assess the effects of agency intervention.
Law and business schools have recently begun teaching negotiation.
They recognized that while negotiation had been a major activity in these
fields, it had never been legitimized, researched, and developed into a formal academic area. They now teach students to be critical, analytic, reflective, and skillful in negotiation. This was only possible when a body of
empirical research and theory on negotiation was developed. The same professional development could be fostered in the complex and important
work of controlling child abuse.
The research and analytic perspective of sociology is particularly compatible with a negotiation model of multi-profession and cross-organization
decision making. We believe sociological research can provide an empirical base for the critical evaluation of negotiation processes and outcomes.
Conclusions
In addition to a research agenda, focused on evaluating a negotiation
perspective of child abuse case processing, there is an immediate practice
agenda. If much of interagency decision making is truly negotiation, and
perhaps informally mediated negotiation as well, are there benefits to recognizing it as such and doing it well. Many social workers and other
agency personnel are not prepared to negotiate effectively. There is an
;emerging literature on designing systems and organizations to facilitate
negotiated resolution of differences. Record keeping systems can be
designed to capture salient features of negotiation so that assessment and
;monitoring is relevant to actual organizational practice. Education and
training in the theory and practice of negotiation and; mediation could
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strengthen the practice of negotiation in the shadow of children's best
interest.
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Power Imbalance within the Setting of
Special Education Mediation:
A View toward Structural and
Organizational Factors Influencing
Outcome

Jennifer Adams Mastrofski
ABSTRACT
Research on mediation as a means of dispute resolution has alluded to potential injustices that may emerge from the process when conflict occurs between
persons of unequal status. An example of such inequity would be when one parly
in the dispute is an individual who is somehow dependent on the second party
(who may represent an organization or institution).
In a recent evaluation of special education mediation services, structural and
organizational factors were identified that could influence the impact of power
imbalance between disputants (parents and school personnel) independent of
the mediation session itself. This paper examines these factors and proposes
that future research broaden its perspective on power-imbalance theories associated with mediation. In particular, the present examination brings into question the sufficiencies of claims that mediation is procedurally inappropriate
when an inherent power imbalance exists in conflict situations.
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Introduction
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) refers to innovative approaches to
ending conflicts which are usually less formal and costly than traditional
litigation. Such approaches can include conciliation, arbitration, or mediation, and recently have been advocated, particularly when disputants anticipate long-term future relationships. Thus, conflict between family
members, school personnel, and parents, and between landlords and tenants
are especially suitable to ADR processes.
While numerous arguments have been established in favor of ADR, literature is also replete with arguments against its use in certain conflict situations. In particular, concern is raised that ADR may be inappropriate
when power disparities exist between disputants (Goldberg 1989; Levine
1986; Marks, Johnson, & Szanta 1984). One example of this condition
would be when one party in dispute represents an institution and the other
party stands alone as an individual.
The concept of power imbalance within ADR forums is not uncommon,
but how the concept is operationalized and applied varies by context
(Goldberg 1989; Marks, Johnson & Szanta 1984; and others). With variation, the impact of power imbalance on conflict resolution changes (at least
theoretically) as well. In divorce mediation, for instance, unequal economic
bases (resources) represent one form of imbalance; differential status within
the family system symbolizes imbalance at the interpersonal level. In landlord/tenant negotiations, legal authority of one party may place that disputant in an "advantageous" position for winning in mediated sessions,
which may change by the nature of the dispute (Folberg & Taylor 1984).
Special education mediation represents the unique situation wherein
power imbalance between disputants could occur at a number of levels. The
parties may have a history of differential status in that parents generally
follow the guidance and expertise of educators. Educators have resources
with which to teach special-needs children (symbolizing an "economic"
advantage); and, finally, educators employ legal authority (primarily from
Public Law 94-142—see Handler 1986) to allocate these resources for special education needs.
The concern with power imbalance has been applied to special education mediation services (SEMS) over the last few years. Several states have
adopted voluntary mediation services as an alternative to due process (formal, adversarial proceedings) when disagreements emerge between parents
and school personnel over educational services for students with special
needs (Goldberg 1989; Folberg & Taylor 1984).
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Many states use employees of their educational system to serve as mediators (Goldberg 1989; Singer & Nace 1984); thus, in this forum for ADR,
school parties in disputes are seen as more powerful than parents at the
onset. Imbalance is exacerbated by direct administrative links between
mediation services and the institution or school represented in the dispute.
The Impact of Power Imbalances in Special Education Mediation
According to The National Survey on Special Education Mediation
Systems, 35 reporting states had a SEMS in place by 1989; another 10
reporting states were developing SEMS at that time (Sykes 1989). The earliest reported SEMS was established in 1972; the most recent were established the year of the report.1 Evaluations of SEMS since inception have
occurred on a state-by-state basis.
Assessments of school-administered, special education mediation have
been mixed, but the theme of power disparities lies at the root of both positive and negative conclusions. Singer and Nace (1984) contend that schoolbased mediation is very successful despite acknowledgment of power
imbalance expressed by some participants. Goldberg (1989), on the other
hand, maintains that true mediation is infeasible when services are provided
by an institution for that institution and an individual disputant's benefit.
The issue of power imbalance between disputants in this situation is critical to his belief:
State sponsored [special education] mediation also fails to compensate (or may exacerbate) the inherently unequal position that
exists between parents and school officials....Considering the
power that school officials have in terms of experiences, training, familiarity with jargon, and potential future decisions, it is
absurd to suggest that parties could ever be equal mediation
partners. (452)
Common questions raised within most discussions of power-imbalance
theory in special education mediation, thus, relate to whether justice can be
served, given predetermined inequality of disputants (i.e., will the outcome
be fair to both parties?) and whether mediators can manipulate (i.e., equalize) such inequality by virtue of behavior within the mediation session
itself (Simkin & Fidandis 1986). Within this narrow framework, parties
appear satisfied with mediation, regardless of their symbolic positions as
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institutions or private individuals (Singer & Nace 1985). In fact, such
evidence may be shortsighted insofar as researchers conclude that if the
process itself can adjust for power imbalance (vis-a-vis behavior of the
mediator), further concern over disparities is unfounded.
This article argues that the mediation session is only one of three key
junctures in dispute resolution. During mediation, mediators clearly do have
obligations and capabilities to equalize negotiations as well as formulating
mediated agreements. Nevertheless, mediators are limited in their potential
to modify the effects of power imbalances before and after mediation. The
claim here is that power imbalance may influence disputants at each of
these main junctures (points at which mediation is mutually agreed upon,
mediation occurs, and outcome is implemented) and does so with a domino
effect. In other words, with each conflict-resolution encounter between
unequal parties, during which the outcome consistently reflects positive
reinforcement for one party more than the other, imbalance is perpetuated
and, in fact, exacerbates the potential for unequal outcomes over time.
In a recent evaluation of special education mediation, specifically, findings reveal that unequal status may account for the following differences
across the three junctures: (1) service provisions leading to mediation; (2),
opinions of parties about the sessions held; and, (3) equitability of outcome
post-mediation. 2 While the focus of this evaluation was not to test the
hypotheses just outlined, data provide ingredients for postulating a dominoeffect theory in conflict-resolution settings involving parties of unequal
status. A brief summary of this evaluation follows.
Evaluation of Special Education Mediation Services

Overview
The data summarized below were collected as part of a year-long evaluation of one state-administered special education mediation program. The
program had been in existence for almost three years at the point of evaluation and had trained over 40 mediators during that time. Mediators for
the program come from a variety of professional backgrounds across the
state. Each mediator was trained by a highly reputed national training center and is compensated on a case by case basis. A few mediators have bilingual ability. Mediators are not state employees intentionally, so that
disputants will not perceive them as biased toward the state's education
department. Most mediators had negotiated one or two cases each at the
time of the evaluation. Mediation is a voluntary alternative to due process
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when both parties agree to have their cases mediated. Either party in dispute can initiate a request for mediation.
Cases Mediated
During the evaluation period, all forms used by the state program were
reviewed and revised, existing data were analyzed, and a follow-up survey
of parties and participants was developed and disseminated by the evaluation project.3
At the time data collection ended for the evaluation project, the program
had received 216 requests for mediation. Of these, 127 were initiated by
parents and 32 resulted in agreement for mediation. Eighty-nine requests
were initiated by school parties and resulted in 47 agreements for mediation. Thus, the majority of cases mediated were initiated by requests from
school parties.
From available information on mediated cases, parties who had initiated
a request for services had typically heard of mediation from pamphlets and
other written materials, followed by personal communication. 4 The SEMS
processed requests of one party (usually a phone request) by contacting the
second party (by phone or letter) and establishing whether both parties
agreed to try mediation for their dispute. At the point of agreement, SEMS
staff proceeded to identify and retain a mediator, choose an acceptable
mediation site, and schedule the session. Confirmation of mediation was
prepared in writing for parties and participants. Mediation was not scheduled if a previously agreed upon plan for due process was scheduled within
five days of the request for mediation.
At the time request for mediation was initiated, parents were more likely
than school parties to list multiple issues in dispute. For instance, almost
75 percent of parents listed at least two issues, while about 56 percent of
school parties listed the same number. There was general agreement on
what issues were being disputed, however. Thus, issues presented by each
party individually coincided with final issues to be mediated in the vast
majority of cases.
Both parents and school parties listed the same top three issues in dispute first, over all other issues in dispute: (1) placement, (2) program, and
(3) testing or evaluation classification. Under placement, there was a dispute as to whether the student should be receiving services within a regular placement, a special education setting such as an intermediate unit,
private or home schooling, a special preschool program, or other placement
options. Within programming issues, parents and/or school parties were in
disagreement over specific aspects of the educational program the student
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was receiving, especially delivery and quality of services, adequacy of
teacher training, and program content. Finally, testing or evaluation classification referred to disputes over the validity and reliability of evaluations,
the implications of classification categories for educational services, and
concerns over changes in classification.
When parties mediated their disputes through SEMS, there were at least
two issues in dispute for 71 percent of the cases; at least three issues in
dispute for 30 percent of the cases, and at least four disputed issues
between parents and school parties in 7 percent of the cases.
Analysis of issues in dispute, by cases resulting in agreement and those
terminating without agreement, revealed little variation between the groups
in the final issues mediated. Placement was identified most frequently as
the primary issue in dispute, whether or not agreement was reached. In
addition, program, individual educational plans, test/evaluation, and classification were cited as issues in cases reaching agreement. A similar pattern
of concerns was identified for cases terminating with no agreement (except
for program issues, which were mentioned less frequently).
Seventy-one mediations were held during the evaluation period; sixtyone of these reached agreements between the disputing parties (representing an 86 percent rate of agreement). Mediation sessions from evaluated
cases lasted as little as one or two hours to more than eight hours. The
majority of sessions lasted three to five hours; however, about one-third of
all sessions lasted six to eight hours. Mediators are deliberately given only
general information about the issues in dispute—as documented by both
parties—along with the necessary background information. Special education mediation, as most mediation forums, are formatted to incorporate fact
finding into the multiple stages of the mediation process (see Folberg &
Taylor 1984, 38-72); therefore, elaborate details of the disputed issues are
reserved for the mediation process proper. 5
Typically, students whose special educational needs were being mediated were males (51 out of 71 cases involved males) between the ages of
10 and 11, were multiply handicapped, and were being served within a regular school setting at the time of mediation. Mediation occurred primarily
in non-neutral sites (buildings owned or administered by schools) 31 days
after a request for mediation was initiated.
Short Term Satisfaction of Parties and Participants
The majority of parties and participants were satisfied with services rendered and the immediate outcome of mediation, although school parties
expressed higher levels of satisfaction than parents. Moreover, mediators
were generally viewed as impartial, knowledgeable of the problem, and
highly regarded for their role in dispute resolution.
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Participants tended to represent more extreme negative perspectives than
any of the other groups, although such views represent a minority of all
participants. In particular, participants were more likely to criticize technical aspects (scheduling, location) of mediation and the mediator.
Long Term Implementation of Agreements
Parents and school parties had very different perspectives toward implementation of mediated agreements. Parents felt less involved with implementation than school parties and also believed that less of the agreement
was implemented in the long term than school parties. Most parents and
school parties felt there was nothing else they could have done to carry out
mediated agreements.
Mediators
Mediators felt adequately trained for their responsibilities in facilitating
dispute resolution and compared their training with the program favorably
with other training experiences. In most cases, mediators felt positive about
some aspect of mediation regardless of final outcome. Nevertheless, almost
all mediators felt disappointment over some component of mediation, such
as an individual's behavior or poor physical setting. Further, they expressed
a sense of being constantly challenged with mediation due to some need—
such as for more knowledge in a particular area or for experience in dealing with unpredictable circumstances.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Mediation
Over time, parents, school parties, and participants for both sides
believed that mediation's greatest strength lies in the mediator's role as a
neutral third party in dispute resolution. 6 Most parents stated that mediation's greatest weakness is associated with difficulty in putting agreements
into action—a view expressed by some parent participants as well. (Recall
that parent participants are invited to mediation by parents to provide
advice, input, or emotional support to the parents.) Parent participants commented as frequently, however, that mediators cannot make unwilling parties compromise. Most school parties and school participants also believed
that mediation's greatest weakness lies in the limitations associated with
disputants' unwillingness to compromise.
General comments of parties and participants several months after mediation reflected mediation's assets for saving money, effectiveness in coming to agreement during mediation, and the competence of mediators.
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Negative comments focused on lack of enforceability, lack of progress
post-mediation, and a sense of coercion sometimes perceived in mediation.
Some comments indicated that agreements were actually ineffective or
meaningless some months post-mediation.
Less than one-half of parents and school parties stated they would definitely use the program again for a future problem. Of persons who stated
problems recurred since mediation, very few have turned to special education mediation to resolve the new dispute.
Opportunity to Assess Power Imbalance over Time
Findings from this evaluation provided the opportunity to assess theoretically the impact of power imbalance within the context of special education mediation over a period of time pre- and post-mediation. Hypotheses
have been subsequently generated to reflect how unequal status of disputants may influence final resolution. These hypotheses are framed within
the context of the three junctures of dispute resolution described earlier.
Specific research questions that should be addressed in future studies are
then formulated.
Power Imbalance at Three Junctures: The Domino Effect
The First Juncture—Who Chooses Mediation?
In most cases where requests for mediation are made by one party in the
program just described, mediation did not occur for a variety of reasons that
have not been systematically documented, including request withdrawals,
conciliations, or refusal of the other party. (Other critical issues related to
rejection of mediation were also unavailable, such as demographic characteristics of parents in cases not mediated as compared to those mediated and
perceptions of issues in dispute.) Requests were made almost three times
more often than cases were actually mediated. And the vast majority of all
requests were initiated by parents, as noted earlier.
Technically, each party has the power to reject mediation, but school personnel refused an offer for mediation far more often than parents for reasons unknown. When school parties did agree to mediate, parents were quite
likely to agree to it than vice versa. When cases reached mediation, then,
they had usually been initiated by school personnel rather than by parents.
Consequently, special education mediation in the program evaluated serves
schools' requests (the institution) more than parents' requests for services.
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Two hypotheses are proposed to account for these differences, and both
are tied directly to theories of power disparities introduced earlier.
First, school parties are more highly informed of their rights and stance
with regard to disputes; thus, they can better pick and choose a dispute resolution forum that corresponds with this knowledge base. Further, alternatives to mediation such as due process do not carry the same financial
burden for school parties as they do for parents. At the point of deciding
whether or not simply to attempt mediation (the first juncture), then, school
parties are equipped with greater knowledge and freedom from financial
considerations in making that decision.7
Second, when parents are offered mediation, they are in a far weaker
position to turn it down because of the ramifications associated with such
refusals. At the very base, school personnel are equated with authority that
must be adhered to. Sense of responsibility to children and costs of alternatives are further incentives unique to parents for agreeing to mediation.
The first research question to pursue, therefore, (and not available at the
time of evaluation), is what accounts for this differential choice of mediation by parents and school personnel? Such data could certainly reveal
whether power of school personnel at the onset provides these parties with
greater options and awareness for choosing a particular dispute resolution
forum. If empirical evidence emerges to support the hypotheses outlined
above, then power imbalance between disputants has influenced dispute
resolution before mediation has begun.
The Second Juncture—Mediating on School Turf
The study of special education mediation services also concluded, recall,
that parents and school parties feel differently about the mediation process
itself, although both groups are generally positive. One possible explanation for differences might be unequal treatment in mediation, but this conclusion is not supported at present. A second hypothesis is more logical
from the standpoint of power-imbalance theories (Goldberg 1989).
Greater satisfaction levels expressed by school parties could very well
reflect the function of their role in initiating mediation, enhanced by comfort with the mediation setting (90 percent of all mediations in the evaluation were held in school-affiliated sites). In contrast, lower satisfaction of
parents can reasonably be the result of reactive, rather than proactive, roles
in the dispute resolution process (based on statistics cited earlier), exacerbated by institutional settings for reaching dispute resolution. Mediation is
equated with "the school" because that is where mediation most likely
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takes place, and because "the school" most likely initiated a request for
mediation when it occurs.
In order to test the hypothesis that increasing power at the point of mediation initiation (the first juncture) impacts parties' assessment of their
experiences during mediation (the second juncture), analyses of outcome
that controls for the variable of initiating party should be pursued. (Again,
such analysis was not possible within the constraints of the state evaluation.) In particular, the following question needs to be addressed in relation
to the impact of power disparities on satisfaction with mediation: Do differences in satisfaction with mediation between parties dissipate when the
percentages of actual mediated cases initiated by school parties and parents
are equalized?
Without such information, there is no way of ascertaining whether lower
satisfaction ratings of parents are linked to their reactive (i.e., subordinate)
rather than proactive (i.e., superordinate) roles in the dispute resolution
process, exacerbated by non-neutral the settings of most mediations.
The Third Juncture—Who is Responsible?
Finally, as described earlier, the special education evaluation revealed
that school parties believed they are responsible for some or most of the
implementation associated with mediated agreements. In contrast, parents
felt less responsible for implementation generally. Further, school parties
rated implementation higher than parents, and parents exhibited more
uncertainty about implementation overall.
At the last phase of dispute resolution, then—implementation of mediated agreements—parents exhibit the most concrete evidence of powerlessness. The school (institution) ensures resolution of disputes; thus, it has
ultimate symbolic power to effect mediation "success." (Not surprisingly,
schools report more positively than parents that long-term success—implementation—is accomplished.) Parents have lesser roles in monitoring or
bringing about success. As a result, parents are more likely frustrated and
less satisfied with the process over time.
Research on power imbalance in ADR cannot ignore this critical period,
because it is intimately linked with long-term satisfaction of mediation as
well as long-term success of mediation. Based on the evaluation of special
education mediation, I hypothesize that parental dissatisfaction with the
process over time would be lessened if parents were actively involved in
all components of implementation and were consulted by school personnel
throughout this period. Whether or not schools must actually formalize the
majority of mediated agreements, the sense of powerlessness felt by parents
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is most likely a function of their interactions (or lack thereof) with school
parties at this crucial juncture of dispute resolution. To test this hypothesis
in depth, investigations into events taking place during implementation are
called for. Qualitative assessment of inequitable outcome for parties of differential status should reveal whether role in implementation does influence outcome over time. This ideology is not dissimilar from the rationale
for mediating disputes, generally, and for self-determination over traditional adversarial dispute resolution processes.

Broadening the Scope of Power Imbalance Theory
Theory associated with dispute resolution in the face of power disparities has a strong conceptual base backed by limited empirical data. In order
to understand the full impact of power imbalance in dispute resolution processes, researchers must recognize and examine organizational and structural dynamics that can either aggravate or mollify inherent differentiation.
With data that test the hypotheses proposed within this article, the possibility exists for intervention at key junctures in ADR which could produce
more equitable outcome for disputants, regardless of their relative status.
Perhaps researchers and critics of ADR in situations of imbalance have
placed far too much of the burden on mediators to make negotiations
"right" in these instances.
This article formulates a theoretical model for assessing precisely how
the existence of disparities may influence dispute handling from onset to
final resolution. Future research should enhance our knowledge about
extraneous influences on mediation outcome at multiple points and/or
whether intervention can curtail this domino effect on the total dispute resolution process. Power imbalance may best characterized as a "condition"
in dispute resolution. Increased knowledge is needed about behavioral consequences of this condition in order to understand its true influence over
equitable outcome for disputants of unequal power.
NOTES
1. Massachusetts was the first state to provide SEMS; Indiana and New Mexico developed
SEMS as late as 1989.
2. Specific identification of the evaluation site is omitted to ensure confidentiality.
3. Parties were comprised of one or both parents and a school administrator with authorization to commit resources. Participants were made up of a limited number of persons
invited by parties to support their respective cases. All parties and participants were asked to
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evaluate mediation immediately after the session using questionnaires designed by the mediation program. Mediators completed separate questionnaires at this time. Parties were also
asked to complete additional evaluations at 10-days and 3-months post-mediation.
4. Data were missing in almost one-third of the mediated cases.
5. Mediators in this SEMS were trained to caucus with parties as part of overall mediation process. Thus, parties initially meet with the mediator and participants to set forth perceptions of the dispute after which time each party has the opportunity to meet privately with
the mediator. Negotiations and agreement-writing stages follow the caucusing period.
6. These data were collected from a follow-up survey during the evaluation period, a minimum of six-months post-mediation.
7. This situation is quite different from Goldberg's (1989) attention toward school personnel's expertise once they engage in the process of ADR.
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Workplace Dispute Resolution and
Gender Inequality *

Patricia A. Gwartney-Gibbs
Denise H. Lach
ABSTRACT
Despite substantial bodies of research on employment differentials between
women and men and on conflict in the workplace, little prior research links the
two. This article summarizes preliminary results of a study which attempts to fill
this knowledge gap. We conceive of workplace disputes as having origins, processes, and outcomes. We theorize that these three components are patterned by
sex roles, sex segregation of jobs, and work structures (unions, firms, industries). Our findings indicate that workplace jurisprudence operates differentially for women and men employees, as hypothesized. The results suggest
linkages to other aspects of employment inequality and provide a theoretical
framework for further research and policy making.

Nearly all organizations have some form of workplace jurisprudence,
that is, informal and formal rules that are used by employees, managers,
supervisors, unions, and others in the employment relationship to resolve
conflicts and disputes in the workplace. Such rules function "as a system
of private law ... with its own interpretations, practices, and customs built
up over time" (Thomson 1974).
* Printed with permission of Plenum Publishing Company. This article originally appeared in
Negotiation Journal, 1991 7(2), 187-199
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The presence of effective means of dispute resolution in the workplace
protects employees against arbitrary authority and unjust punitive action and
provides a route for systematic review of complaints and grievances (Scott
1965). Such procedures help to avoid lengthy, bitter strikes, litigation, government agency action, and binding arbitration, as well as promote fairness
in treatment, legitimacy of the organization, and ultimately, efficiency in production. For these reasons, concern with the equity of workplace dispute resolution mechanisms is of interest to employers, unions, and employees.
Despite considerable interest in the study of industrial justice from the
1940s through the mid-1970s, these intraorganizational processes and their
consequences have not been updated to account for the growth of female
labor force participation since World War II, even in recent assessments
(Lewin & Peterson 1988; McCabe 1988; Westin & Feliu 1988). Moreover,
the substantial bodies of research on employment differentials between
women and men in economics, sociology, industrial relations, and management have done little to link dispute resolution issues with issues of
employment inequality.
This article summarizes preliminary results of a study that attempts to
fill this knowledge gap. First, we outline our conceptual model of dispute
resolution in the workplace and gender differences in it and summarize our
research methodology. Then, we review our preliminary findings for gender differences in the origins, processes, and outcomes of workplace disputes and discuss their implications for theory and practice.
Conceptual Model of Workplace Dispute Resolution
In the abstract, dispute resolution in the workplace concerns an attempt
by a participant in the workforce to resolve a problem in the employment
relationship. We conceive of dispute resolution as comprised of three components: origins, processes, and outcomes. In the course of ordinary workday activities, disputes arise over issues such as wages, discipline,
tardiness, parental or family emergency leave, affirmative action, discrimination, job posting, insurance, job performance, and hours. Once a dispute
is articulated, it may be pursued in various ways, such as informal settlement in conversation, peer review in the workplace, or formal procedures
guided by union or company policy. The goal of such processes is to
resolve disputes in the workplace justly. The extent to which dispute
resolution mechanisms operate equitably for women as well as for men in
the workplace is the subject matter of this research.
We postulate that all three components of dispute resolution in the workplace—origins, processes, and outcomes—are patterned by gender and,
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given the highly sex-segregated nature of employment, by sex type of jobs.
Thus, we argue that women, incumbents of female-typed jobs, and tokens
in jobs 1 have different disputes, different experiences in dispute processing, and different outcomes in the settlement of disputes than do men and
the incumbents of male-typed and mixed-sex jobs. We also argue that the
three components of the dispute resolution process are patterned by work
structures and that these may interact with gender roles and the sex segregation of jobs. 2
In a detailed review of empirical and theoretical literature, we found few
prior tests of these postulates; moreover, what little prior research exists is
often contradictory in its findings (Gwartney-Gibbs & Lach 1990). Thus,
we conducted exploratory, qualitative research to assess the validity of our
conceptual model of gender differences in workplace dispute resolution.
This descriptive information is intended to generate theoretical propositions for later systematic testing.
Data and Analysis

Sixty in-depth interviews were conducted with women and men clerical
and maintenance workers, half at "Firm A," a unionized public service
agency, and half at "Firm B," a nonunionized manufacturing firm. We
selected the firms for their contrasting procedures to resolve employees'
workplace disputes: Firm A has a union-negotiated grievance procedure,
and Firm B has a widely admired (but rarely studied) "open door" type of
policy.
Firm A's grievance procedure is negotiated bilaterally with the union.
The procedure involves several informal and formal steps and covers only
certain types of conflicts . The chief steward estimated that the union hears
of 30 to 40 inquiries about disputes each month, but only about 10 each
year actually go all the way through the grievance procedure, and typically
only one reaches arbitration every other year. Workers often spoke of the
grievance procedure as a last resort; nevertheless, they said they do go to
stewards frequently for information.
Firm B unilaterally offers its employees an "open door" policy, which
they learn about during new-employee orientation. The open door policy
allows employees to go to their supervisor's supervisor and on up the chain
of command with a complaint they feel they cannot, or do not wish to, take
to their own supervisor. The open door policy appears to be used frequently, but informally, because employees have frequent, informal contact
with managers. Also, Firm B's use of quality circles appears to anticipate
and defuse disputes before they explode.
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Despite different dispute resolution mechanisms, the two firms are similar in important ways. Both have reputations for somewhat liberal personnel policies and a degree of institutionalized informality. Both are
subdivisions of larger organizations, employ approximately the same number of workers (3,000-4,000) at the sites studied, and have similar mixes of
professional, lower white collar, and blue collar employees. Both firms are
regarded as good places to work in their cities in the Pacific Northwest, and
thus, many employees we spoke with had worked there for long periods of
time. In order to maximize the range of experience with disputes and dispute resolution in the workplace, interviewees were selected from a highly
female-concentrated occupation (clerical) and a highly male-concentrated
occupation (maintenance), including a small number of tokens (i.e., male
clerical and female maintenance workers). Altogether, 34 clerical workers
(including receptionists, clerks, secretaries, administrative assistants, and
word processors) and 26 maintenance workers (laborers, custodians, skilled
craftsworkers, and skilled repair technicians) were interviewed.
In addition to diversity by sex and occupation, sample members varied
by demographic characteristics, employment characteristics, and the nature
of their workplace disputes and resolution. Neither group of interviewees is
statistically representative of all employees at Firm A or Firm B, but—
appropriate to the exploratory nature of the research—we heard a wide
range of accounts of dispute resolution in both firms, without having to
interview hundreds of employees in a random sample.
Interviewees were asked to describe the history of each of their workplace problems and disputes, from beginning to end. In the unionized firm,
we asked interviewees to include both grievable (according to the union
contract) and nongrievable disputes. In Firm B (which has the open door
type of policy), we asked interviewees to describe both small and large
problems. The interviews, which averaged one-and-one-half hours in length,
were transcribed and then coded and analyzed. Quotes and anecdotes from
interviews are used to examine the theoretical postulates introduced earlier.
Findings
In presenting and interpreting our findings, we draw upon gender role
theory from social psychology to examine individual-level gender differences in workplace disputes. At the level of jobs, we rely upon theories of
occupational sex segregation out of the stratification literature in sociology.
Finally, we draw selectively from theory in industrial relations, organizations, and management concerning formal mechanisms of dispute resolution in the workplace. In each section, these theoretical perspectives guide
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our analysis of the origins, processes, and outcomes of workplace disputes.
We stress that our findings are preliminary and subject to modification in
continuing data analysis. 3
Gender and the Origins of Workplace Disputes
Gender role theory suggests that the etiology, or origins, of workplace
disputes experienced by women may be different from those experienced
by men (cf. Gwartney-Gibbs & Lach 1990). Our findings on the origins of
workplace disputes support parts of gender role theory, but contain some
surprises.
Sixty different types of workplace disputes were mentioned during the
interviews. The most common concerned coworkers or direct supervisors.
Twenty-nine interviewees discussed difficulties with coworkers, especially
poor work performance and personality conflicts. Thirty-two interviewees
recounted disputes with supervisors, particularly unfair performance evaluations, task assignments, training, personality conflicts, and generally poor
supervisory styles. Other problems referred to organizational policies and
practices, including benefits, salary, equipment and material, hiring, and
work schedules.
We posited that women workers would be more likely than men to experience problems associated with family and household duties. We found,
however, that women and men alike in both firms had difficulties with such
matters as coordinating child care and attending to sick family members.
These difficulties occurred even though both firms seem sensitive to the
needs of parents in the workplace, generally providing some allowances for
flexible start and quit times, leaves for birth or sickness of children, and
tolerance of family needs. Conflicts arose mainly over the implementation
of these provisions. For example, one female clerical worker in Firm A
recalled:
My father was ill in the hospital in (a large city 1,000 miles
away) and I needed to go there to help my mother. While I
didn't have trouble getting the time off (using sick leave), which
I'm entitled to, I heard about it several times from my boss after
I returned—about how inconvenient it had been and what a
strain it had put on the department. The general attitude was
that they had done me a favor by letting me do it.
Women did not seem to have more difficulties in implementing "family
friendly" policies than men.
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Consistent with gender role theory, however, women workers appear to
be more sensitive to problems associated with interpersonal relations in the
workplace than men, more often reporting workplace disputes concerning
personality conflicts. Women told us highly detailed episodes of intricate
interpersonal relationships, particularly in clerical offices, which resembled
"hot-houses" of feelings. Men also told us about interpersonal clashes, but
their descriptions tended to be brisk dismissals that they simply did not
seem to care about as much as women.
We hypothesized that because women workers tend to have more intermittent work histories than men, due to their child-bearing and child-rearing roles, they may experience more disputes associated with seniority
issues (layoff, bumping, recall, promotion, reappointment, transfer). From
gender role theory, we also hypothesized that men would be more likely to
experience disputes over discipline, veteran's issues, and union activism.
But we have no strong or consistent evidence to support either notion.
Sex stratification theory in sociology suggests that occupational sex segregation in employment may be related to the origins of workplace disputes
for both women and men in sex-atypical jobs and for women in sex-typical jobs. In particular, disputes may originate for tokens (male clerical
workers and female maintenance workers) in discrimination, harassment,
and social isolation and in gender role spillover for female clericals (i.e.,
gender role stereotyping inappropriate to job duties). We find evidence for
these ideas.
Tokens, both male and female, described many instances of harassment
and discrimination from coworkers and supervisors. But these instances
were generally mild rather than severe, and they were often in the ambiguous realm of personality conflicts. Few of our interviewees would label
their experiences harassment or discrimination, for they seemed unsure
whether it was really occurring or whether they might be at fault in part
themselves. Thus, they were often reluctant to name, or label, how they
were being treated and to ascribe this treatment to their status as tokens. A
young woman, supervising a temporary crew of all-male laborers, found it
difficult to name her subordinates' mocking and insolence as sexual harassment. When they hooted out of a work truck to another woman, "Hey baby
I like what I see," she recognized it as sexual harassment but still was
unable to label her own experiences.
Among token men clerical workers, an unanticipated finding was that
many told us they have "no problems" in the workplace. Yet, they described
situations in their offices that sound suspiciously like problems to us—situations very similar to those described by women clerical workers as hothouse atmospheres in which personality conflicts and small spats exploded
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into major traumas. A possible explanation for this finding is that it is
inconsistent with male gender roles to admit or recognize disputes that are
interpersonal in nature. A clerical worker at Firm A demonstrated this
obliviousness in describing how a conference he had been asked to administer fell through:
It was mostly my fault, but the scheduling and how things were
to be done were not communicated to me clearly by my boss. It
was his program. And so between that and the fact that I wasn't
doing things when I should have, the whole thing fell through.
It wasn't exactly resolved; it was sort of like, "Well, it's happened, it's come apart at the seams, that's it, we just have to go
on." And that was the feeling of both myself and my boss.
Clearly, in the eyes of this clerical worker, his behavior in the workplace
created no problems for himself, his supervisors, or his co-workers.
Gender role spillover suggests that persons in highly sex-segregated
occupations will be treated on the basis of gender role stereotypes in the
workplace (Nieva and Gutek 1981). This may become a disputable issue if
the stereotype has little to do with the requirements of the job or the personality of the worker. Several women clerical workers described disputes
under this rubric. Some reported being disciplined for not acting "nice
enough" or not being "sensitive to the needs of coworkers"—expectations
clearly consistent with gender role stereotypes and less clearly part of a job
description. One clerical worker at Firm A told us that her supervisor
started a work plan (the first step in a disciplinary procedure) that required
her to "be more cheerful and smile more." Importantly, such expectations
were not imposed upon male clerical workers; indeed, several of them
described how they used their gender roles, especially interpersonal aggressiveness, to get their way in the workplace. One male clerical worker
described a confrontation with his female supervisor this way:
She gave me this performance evaluation and I looked at it, and
I couldn't believe it. At first I said, "Well, do you really think
this is appropriate for a performance evaluation? I don't think
so." She got defensive about it and by my interpretation was
insulting. At that point, I got angry. And then we got into a
shouting match for fifteen, twenty minutes.
We chose Firm A and Firm B deliberately because differences in their
dispute resolution forums create different workplace environments for nam-
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ing workplace disputes. Differences between the firms' dispute resolution
forums, however, did not seem to have a substantive effect on the origins
of workplace disputes that interviewees discussed. In both firms, for example, employees discussed problems with supervisors, coworkers, clients,
equipment, and the like. Of course, each firm also had a set of problems
specific to its ongoing situation (for example, maintenance work being contracted out at Firm A and an influx of temporary workers at Firm B), but
most problems mentioned during the interviews occurred in both firms.
In summary, we find evidence for differences in the origins of women's
and men's workplace disputes that appear to be related to gender roles and
to occupational sex segregation, consistent with expectations.4 To the extent
that women and men experience different kinds of workplace disputes,
such as personality conflicts, and to the extent that formal workplace dispute resolution mechanisms are not designed to deal with those differences,
women workers' aggregate patterns of workplace disputes will be different
from men's.
Gender and the Processes of Workplace Dispute Resolution
Gender differences appear clearly in the processes used to resolve disputes in the workplace, and some of these differences may be related to gender roles. We hypothesized that women with workplace disputes would be
less likely to pursue them due to gender role socialization, the lack of provision for female-typed issues in formal procedures, and a lack of sympathy or support on the part of male gatekeepers (supervisors and union
stewards) of the formal procedures. We find evidence to support these ideas.
Women described how difficult it is to resolve personality conflicts
through formal channels. A union steward at Firm A reported:
I've talked to people who've told me, "My supervisor's driving
me nuts because they're doing this and doing that." And it's
really hard to prove any of that stuff. And yet they tell me lots
of times that they come across as being the terrible person. If
it's really an out-and-out illegal thing that the supervisor is
doing, then you can get 'em for it. But if it's just subtle little
things, it's really hard.
At Firm B, a skilled maintenance worker fears that she "soils the workplace
somehow, with messy interpersonal details" for her male coworkers. To
avoid "unsettling" them, she takes home work-related emotional issues and
attempts to resolve them there on her own. Another described "a personal-
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ity clash" with her supervisor which she believes inhibited her promotion
chances. She invoked the open door, going around her supervisor to try to
resolve the issue, but felt "it didn't really get resolved." Because of this
unresponsiveness, she says, "I don't think I'll ever use the open door again.
It just didn't work the best for me." Even in cases of interpersonal conflict
severe enough to be labeled harassment (a charge our interviewees were
reluctant to voice), workers perceived that neither the grievance procedure
nor the open door policy was designed to resolve such issues.
Women workers consistently reported using lateral transfers to move
away from disputes, while men were more likely to use institutional dispute resolution methods provided by the company. A clerical worker at
Firm A described the pattern:
[Lateral transfers are] a common solution. The first thing a person usually thinks of—at least in the clerical sector where it's
so easy to move—is to just transfer out. Unless they have so
many things going on in their lives that they can't at that time
think of taking on a new job and having to deal with that. But
most of the time, that's the way that women choose to resolve
their conflicts. Just by hanging in there until they can transfer
out, and doing everything they can to transfer.
Firm B has a policy of not allowing employees to transfer to extricate
themselves from personality conflicts; transfers are allowed only after such
conflicts have been resolved. But our interviews document how women
employees avoid this rule. Consider the following interviewee's comments:
The main reason I was transferring is because of this lady we
were working with who got promoted up. I felt if I had really
told [our supervisor] what was going on, it would have hurt me
and they might not let me go. [A coworker] said that she was
moving because of [the promoted coworker] and she ended up
not getting to move; [the company] wanted them to work their
problems out. So, I kept my mouth shut and just said I was leaving because I wanted to try something new.
We also found ample evidence of a lack of sympathy, particularly among
Firm A's male union stewards, for the personality conflicts that women
workers are more likely to face. One dismissed complaints made by women
maintenance workers as follows:
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All three of the women involved came to me and they all told
me different stories. I tried to get information out of it, but the
stories were so lacking in any real concrete detail that I couldn't
think of anything. I talked with other bargaining unit members
about it, and they said, "Yes, it's terrible—can't do anything
about it." The union hasn't said so in so many words, but the
process required to do something is long and involved and gathering the evidence is so iffy.
Whether transfers to "solve" workplace disputes are part of an avoidance pattern associated with female gender roles or are due, instead, to
opportunity structures associated with female-typed occupations or lack of
support from male gatekeepers of dispute resolution mechanisms remains
an open question. At Firm A, women's use of lateral transfers was greater
than at Firm B, but that may be because Firm A has more mobility opportunities for clerical workers than Firm B or because of Firm B's policy that
personality conflicts must be resolved before employees are allowed to
transfer.
We hypothesized that occupational sex segregation is related to the processes of resolving workplace disputes, but in different ways for tokens and
nontokens. For tokens, we expect that high visibility generates pressure to
conform in order to gain acceptance from the dominant group; if disputes
are voiced, we expect little support to be received from informal networks
to pursue the issue. For those in highly sex-concentrated jobs (nontokens),
we expected greater support from interpersonal networks to resolve disputes both formally and informally.
We find evidence for these claims, but the experiences of male tokens
appear to be different than those of female tokens. For example, a highly
skilled maintenance worker at Firm B found that learning the "male way"
of problem solving was one of the most difficult parts of her job:
[My male co-workers] don't let other men push them around as
much as women do. I see in maintenance how much these men
will make a stand. They're not at all afraid to confront [the
manager] in front of a whole group. They're right out there in
the open with a loud voice and criticism. It's just so different
than how women respond. I think there's a lot to learn; part of
me was learning to make my stand too. It's very acceptable for
men to express anger in the workplace, and a lot of them do;
they almost expect it—almost want it. It's not as acceptable for
a woman to express anger in the workplace.
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Women maintenance workers we talked with often had difficulty articulating their conflicts, finding coworkers to talk with, and finding out what
to do. Sometimes, the processes went on for years and the conflicts worsened while the worker was waiting for the next step to occur. In part, this
has to do with the nature of the conflicts (the mildness of social ostracism
compared to a fistfight, for example, and the difficulty of documenting or
concretely describing the ambiguous feeling of exclusion or isolation from
other workers). But it is also because formal dispute resolution mechanisms
rarely have provisions for, or experience with, the types of conflicts tokens
are more likely to experience.
Moreover, cases of employees (tokens and nontokens) who struggled
with the difficult task of documenting discrimination and harassment were
legends in both firms' corporate culture and served to deter individuals
from pursuing disputes through to resolution. Thus, few tokens with disputes attempted to use formal mechanisms of resolution; rather, they lived
with their conflicts or resolved them informally.
Male tokens were less likely to report any problems at all, as mentioned
earlier. When they did, however, they described using institutional procedures successfully to resolve conflicts, and they mentioned managers sensitive to personal issues that created temporary problems in the workplace
(e.g., a wife temporarily unavailable for child care). Moreover, several
male tokens described being adopted, like pets or mascots, by their female
coworkers and coached in resolving disputes over such issues as promotion, equipment, and personal space. A clerical worker at Firm B clearly
enjoyed his role:
I knew all these other secretaries on site. We'd go to meetings and
they'd always give me a bad time; they all enjoyed me. Its a big
thing being an admin [administrative] person, being in the trenches
like that. I understood what they were going through, so there was
camaraderie in that sense. I was probably a group mascot.
Problems and disputes of male tokens were less often in the range of interpersonal difficulties, but when such problems did occur, they did not conform to the passive and subordinate behavior stereotypical of clerical
workers. A clerical worker at Firm A illustrated his method for handling
conflicts in the workplace:
You gotta look at it this way: I'm 39 years old and I'm not a
woman. When I'm dealing with these people [professionals], a
lot of them are my contemporaries, a few of them are even
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younger than I am. So it's like, you know, are they gonna give
me a lot of flack, really? You see what I mean? So I'm not too
worried about it. Are they gonna try to bully me? No! Cuz like
I said, I'm older than some of them and I'm not a woman. I
don't flip out if someone tries to abuse me. If they threaten me,
I threaten them right back.
Such men draw upon their male gender roles as experienced outside the
workplace, and they are treated as "men" by the persons they serve, even
in a predominantly female occupation.
We hypothesized that the different formal dispute resolution forums
available within Firm A and Firm B would have different consequences for
employees' access to and experiences with such forums. Both firms provide regularized and well-exercised dispute resolution mechanisms, but
these are different in character as well as in the environments they create
for resolving disputes. While we find that these structural differences
between the firms are associated with differential processes of workplace
dispute resolution, we also find similarities, particularly in the key role
played by the gatekeepers of the dispute resolution forum and in the fear
of retribution. Each of these is discussed below.
Some employees at Firm A, both women and men, expressed dissatisfaction in how a question or grievance was handled by a union steward,
and this seemed to color their opinions of the union in general. Importantly,
others at Firm A, most particularly women, viewed the union as a source
of strength and help during conflicts. Union stewards helped them learn the
process of filing grievances, attended disciplinary meetings with their
supervisors, accompanied them to related appointments outside the workplace, and generally reminded them of their rights to pursue grievances.
One clerical worker described what her steward did in pursuing her
grievance:
She heard my story. She would have lunch with me and try to
get details from me. A lot of times when I talked with her, I was
in tears; I was just beside myself. She said, "There is no question that you are being railroaded, that you are the victim, that
(your supervisor and co-workers] wanted to get you out any
way they could." She said she had never seen a case like this.
This was after she talked with my department to see exactly
what was going on. Then she said, "You definitely need to file
a grievance." She arranged meetings, she contacted my doctor,
and she contacted Personnel. She knew exactly what to do, and
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if she wasn't sure, she would check it out. She really kept on
the ball, because if we missed one little meeting or one little
thing, they could throw it out.
Men at Firm A did not describe this type of relationship with union stewards. They talked matter-of-factly about the protection provided by the
union contract, which some described as adequate and others as inadequate.
While many employees at Firm A said they had gone to their supervisors
before going to the union, few spoke of their supervisors as being as instrumental and helpful in dispute resolution as the union stewards they spoke
of; rather, many felt their supervisors had misled them.
At Firm B, corporate culture is carefully inculcated by management, and
employees believe strongly in the open door policy's utility for resolving
workplace disputes. Indeed, many employees seemed to regard it as disloyal
to tell us, as outsiders, of conflicts they experienced. But complaints also
seemed to be regarded as more normal, and doing something about them
seemed to be regarded as more ordinary, in Firm B as compared to Firm A.
For example, employees we spoke with were often not sure if they had
ever invoked the open door policy because so little social distance exists
between themselves and their supervisors and managers. If a problem
comes up, they just say so. When the open door policy fails—i.e., when a
problem is not resolved or an employee sustains retribution—it is commonly viewed as an individual manager's idiosyncrasy rather than as a failing of the company or of the open door policy. A male maintenance
worker's comments illustrate how such idiosyncrasies are rationalized:
There is a certain way that [upper management] would like the
open door policy to be perceived by everybody in the company
and administered. But the problem is that everybody has a different personality and when you've got people dealing with
other personalities, sometimes what corporate wants us to do
isn't always the way it ends up going.
One male clerical worker also described how broad management policy can
be interpreted differently by individual managers:
[Firm B] has a very unique style of dealing with management,
which is, "We don't tell you what to do. We give you broad
guidelines to go by." That has advantages and disadvantages,
and one of the disadvantages is that you can have someone
being very negative and constrictive, etcetera, but still be within
the guidelines.
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In both firms, employees who had had unsatisfactory experiences with
the gatekeepers of dispute resolution forums (union stewards in Firm A and
managers in Firm B) experienced distrust and detachment. When asked to
rate their satisfaction or happiness with their job on a one-to-five scale,
unsuccessful problem solvers consistently rated their satisfaction lower
than successful problem solvers.
Also, in both firms nearly all employees expressed some fear of retribution for pursuing a dispute to resolution. Corporate culture plays an important role here, for tales of retaliation experienced by others heavily
influenced individuals' decisions to file a grievance at Firm A or to go
around a supervisor at Firm B. A female union steward at Firm A described
why workers don't go to the union with workplace disputes:
One of the barriers is a fear of retaliation by the supervisor.
That's a very real fear which is kept going by management.
[Workers] are afraid; they'll say, "I'm going to see if I can solve
this myself, because I really don't want to get 'em mad."
Retaliation can take the form of a painter being stuck painting
bathrooms for the next four years, or it can mean getting the
[worst] jobs. That's a possibility; that's been done. It has been
done to people who have come to the union.
A male maintenance worker at Firm B also recounted a fear that using the
open door policy with certain individual managers might result in retribution:
I think it depends on the manager and their interpretation of the
open door policy. I've seen too often the case where we have
open door policy and people exercise that opportunity, and they
get bit for it later.
It also appears that knowledge of the many steps at which a dispute must
be proved and justified dissuaded use of the grievance procedure at Firm A
and caused some discontent. On the other hand, at Firm B the open door
policy seemed to create an expectation among workers that few workplace
problems should exist, because all disputes are resolved or resolvable.
Problems that persist then violate the normative environment.
It is important to note that most of these preliminary findings concerning work structures say little about differences for women as compared to
men or for tokens as compared to nontokens. While we know that in the
aggregate, women are less likely to be union members and less likely to be
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in industries and large firms that have regularized dispute resolution mechanisms (Gwartney-Gibbs & Hundley 1988), in this study they were, by
design, in the same firms as men.
Gender and the Outcomes of Workplace Dispute Resolution
Women's propensity to use lateral transfers instead of institutional procedures to solve workplace disputes has several possible outcomes. One is
that disputes that do enter the formal processes (e.g., grievance procedures,
arbitration, or government agency action) do not represent the day-to-day
conflicts experienced by women at work.
Another outcome of lateral transfers in Firm A is that several women
clerical workers who transferred found that the best new jobs available to
them were not covered by the union contract, and this worried them greatly
(particularly those who had successfully used the grievance procedure
before). One successful grievant in an emotionally grueling case had this
to say about her new job, which is not contract covered:
It scares me in a way, in the sense that I hope to God that I
never have to go through anything like this again. I wish I was
covered. Then at least I'd feel like I had some protection.
Perhaps the most significant outcome of the use of lateral transfers to
solve disputes in the workplace is that it is likely to put women workers at
a disadvantage in terms of human capital, i.e., job-specific training and
expertise. Employers are more likely to invest in job training and offer promotional opportunities to employees who stay on the job. Our male interviewees did not use transfers to solve workplace disputes and our female
interviewees did; likewise, our male interviewees had longer average job
tenure than our female interviewees.
High levels of turnover and labor force intermittency have long been
recognized as one explanation for lower earnings of women workers. If lateral transfers are similarly associated with lower job-specific skills and
training for women workers than men, turnovers internal to an organization may have a similar effect on the earnings of women who use lateral
transfers to resolve conflict.
A possibe outcome of workplace disputes related to occupational sex
segregation may be the persistence of a sex-segregated work force. That is,
to the extent that sex-segregated work environments are more conducive to
the settlement of everyday workplace disputes, it makes sense for women
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to prefer to work among women and men to work among men. Our data do
not allow a direct test of this hypothesis, but it would be a logical conclusion from the preliminary findings reported here.
In summary, we have found some patterns of gender differences in the
processes and outcomes of workplace disputes that appear to be attributable
to gender roles. But many of the gender differences we find also appear to
interact with sex-typed jobs. Thus, it is difficult to disentangle explanations
of gender differences in workplace dispute resolution which are based upon
gender roles from explanations that give precedence to the different structural positions of women and men workers. Concerning different dispute
resolution forums, we are not yet in a position to evaluate whether an open
door policy or a union-negotiated grievance procedure operates better for
one group as compared with another.
Implications for Theory and Practice
The research summarized here indicates that systems of workplace
jurisprudence operate differentially for women and men employees. We
find that workplace disputes experienced by women workers are often different from those encountered by men; that formal dispute resolution mechanisms often do not accommodate gender differences in dispute origins;
that women workers are often discouraged by the gatekeepers of dispute
resolution forums within unions and firms; and that women are more likely
to transfer jobs to escape disputes, while men are more likely to employ
formal dispute resolution mechanisms. These differences in workplace dispute resolution appear to be rooted in the social organization of work, particularly occupational sex segregation, as much as in gender roles.
Moreover, our results suggest that gender differences in workplace dispute resolution help explain gender differences in other aspects of employment, such as earnings. To the extent that the workplace disputes
experienced by women are different from those encountered by men, and
to the extent that the means for resolving such conflicts are less effective
for women workers than for men, women can be expected to have greater
job turnover, lower job satisfaction, and more occupational segregation—
and, thus, lower earnings.
Our results also suggest that for practitioners to best mediate and negotiate on behalf of women in employment disputes, it is necessary to understand the social structural and gender role experiences that constrain
clients. Working women appear to enter formal dispute resolution forums
less often because gatekeepers discourage them, because of socialized ten-
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dencies to avoid conflict, and because the types of disputes they experience
are less often recognized, informally and formally. If our interviewees'
types of experiences are pervasive, it implies that a large proportion of the
labor force is inadequately represented in employment disputes.
Importantly, however, women workers who enter formal dispute resolution in the workplace and are well-represented report a sense of empowerment that men interviewees do not; this finding is of particular significance
to unionists. 5 Finally, our results suggest that mediators and negotiators
need to understand how corporate culture plays a role in defining disputes
and ways of pursuing resolution. It appears that the consequence of not recognizing and accommodating women's and men's differing patterns of
workplace dispute resolution is to perpetuate employment inequality.
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NOTES
1. "Token" refers to women in male-typed occupations, such as plumbing, and men in
female-typed jobs, such as nursing.
2. Note that our discussion of workplace dispute resolution is conceptually distinct from
procedural or distributive justice in that it concerns the effects of aggregate-level phenomenon
on individuals' (or groups') objective workplace experiences, rather than individuals' subjective perceptions of the equity of dispute resolution procedures or beliefs about the outcomes
they justly deserve (Deutsch 1985; Hochschild 1981; Lind & Tyler 1988; Major 1987).
3. The authors are currently at work on a book manuscript from this research project, tentatively titled Gender And Workplace Conflict.
4. It is important to note that men and women in clerical and maintenance work also often
have similar workplace disputes, such as those over equipment, materials, job evaluations,
task assignments, safety, and training. We stress, however, that women and men still tend to
have different experiences with those disputes due to the nature of the jobs they are typically
in; i.e., women in sex-typical jobs tend to use different equipment and materials and have different task sets and sequences than men in sex-typical jobs.
5. See Gwartney-Gibbs and Lach (forthcoming) for a more detailed discussion of our
findings' implications for unions.
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Consumer Complaints and
Public Policy: Validating the
"Tip-of-the-Iceberg" Theory
Drew Hyman
John Shingler
Mitchell Miller
ABSTRACT
This article examines data from a statewide study to test whether organizational
aberration theory or systemic pattern theory is supported by data on complaining. The article concludes that citizen and consumer complaints can serve both
as early-warning and fail-safe functions leading to increased accountability and
safer, more effective, high quality processes, products, and services.

Are citizen and consumer complaints, especially those to third-party organizations, instances of unique organizational aberrations, or are they indicators of patterns in organizational processes, products and services? Many
organizations behave as if the former is the case. Others use complaints as
strategic intelligence about their operations and products. While there is considerable literature about consumers and consumer behavior when problems
and complaints occur, there is a dearth of literature about complaints and
their role in organizations that cause them. This article takes a step toward
bridging the gap by examining data about consumer complaining to identify
whether complaints should be considered as unique occurrences or whether
they might be reflective of broader organizational malaise. It examines the
97
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"tip-of-the-iceberg" theory using survey data about general consumer problems and in particular, serious utility consumer complaints.
The classics in organizational literature support arguments for both perspectives, but tend to suggest that the former may describe what actually
occurs in most corporations and government agencies. Merton (1952) suggests a process of "sanctification" of organizational norms and the vesting
in middle-level managers of the power and prestige of the structure which
results in "exaggeration of position with reference to the public" and consequent rigidity in defense of established routines. Crozier (1964) discusses
the process whereby organizational culture and communications develop
into patterns of interest at all levels to the point that bureaucracies "become
unable to correct their own errors." Kaufman's (1973) study found considerable communication within agencies coupled with a tendency for information on problems to be screened from high executives. Bar-Josef and
Schild (1973) identify the complaint-handling process as an organizational
defense mechanism whereby complaints are considered as exceptions: once
dealt with individually, organizational action terminates, thus putting the
onus on the external individual or occasional mistakes by the organization.
Kanter (1979) identifies the process as "power failure in management circuits" wherein "limited or blocked lines of information about lower levels
of organization" prevent top executives from hearing about potential problems. This perspective obviates the need to consider further action that
might disturb the status quo within the organization. The implication is that
complaints represent unique events that reflect problems with specific
products, services, or individuals. We will call this perspective the organizational aberration theory of complaining behavior.
Another perspective, which we will call the systemic pattern theory,
asserts that complaints contain messages that extend beyond specific situations to organizational policies, processes, products, or services. Hill
(1981) and Hyman (1979, 1990) suggest that "latent messages of policy or
program interest are often concealed in the specific content of one or many
individual problems. Development of pattern recognition or negative feedback techniques can transform" specific complaints into messages about
systemic patterns or problems (Hyman 1987). An offshoot of this perspective is the tip-of-the-iceberg theory.
The "tip-of-the-iceberg" theory asserts that consumer complaints to a
third-party intervenor are but a portion of those that exist in the broader
population. Third-party intervenors include public and private consumer
protection agencies, regulatory commissions, and government officials,
such as ombudsmen, that receive and investigate complaints. Therefore,
complaints to third-party intervenors can be an important source of
information for managers, executives, and policymakers. Such information
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can make top officials aware of the nature of problems experienced by consumers and of systematic errors in organizational processes and systems
which should be corrected. The use of consumer complaints as policy and
organizational indicators builds on the "tip-of-the-iceberg" principle, using
analysis of the "visible" portion of complaints as being reflective of a
broader universe of problems that exists (Hyman 1987, 1990).
Previous studies into complaining focus on individual steps in the complaining process, such as problem perception, voicing, or resolution. They
lead to the inference that only a portion of all complaints reach third-party
agencies. None has examined the entire process in one study. This study
examines the entire complaint process from problem occurrence through resolution. It takes a pivotal step in the direction of validating the process of formulating public policy based on those complaints which do reach third-party
intervenors. We first examine the extent to which consumers perceive they
have problems or disputes with sellers about products or services. Data is presented on the extent to which consumers take action to resolve problems, with
whom and by whom. We also examine what actions, if any, consumers take
to complain to a third-party agency such as a consumer protection office or
utility regulatory commission. Specific attention is given to problems encountered in the use, payment, and service of residential utilities (gas, electric,
water and telephone). Data on associated issues involving chronic complainers and seriousness of problems are examined.
A research model based on five stages of the consumer problem-solving
process guides the analysis. Data from a major statewide survey are used
to test two competing hypotheses about the nature of complaints. The organizational aberration hypothesis, asserts that most serious consumer problems are perceived, voiced, and presented to the offending business or
organization. Therefore, the universe of complaints is the universe of problems experienced by consumers. The systemic pattern hypothesis states that
individual personality, organizational, or environmental factors operate to
inhibit the problem-solving process at any of several stages following
occurrence. Therefore, the universe of problems perceived, voiced and
complained about will be successively smaller than the universe of problems experienced by consumers. The five-stage consumer problem-solving
process guides our study.
The Five-Stage Consumer Problem-Solving Process
This study examines data on the entire problem-solving process.
Previous research has examined portions of the problem perception and
complaining process. Different studies support parts of the systemic pattern

100

SOCIOLOGICAL PRACTICE/1992

hypothesis. Best (1981) describes three stages of the complaining process:
problem perception, voicing of complaints, and resolution of complaints.
Warland, Herrmann, and Moore (1984) develop a typology of consumers
based upon consumer complaining behavior. Landon (1977) finds that the
availability of a channel for complaining and the expected cost of complaining influences whether people will complain or not. Hyman's (1990)
hierarchy of consumer participation segments consumers into the following
groups: consumer influential are active in their own decision making as
well as in policy and advice-giving activities; active consumers make their
own decisions based on a variety of information sources; dependent consumers do what others tell them (including acquaintances and sellers), thus
allowing others to decide for them; and, nondecision makers have no active
involvement in their decisions, taking no action and/or allowing sellers to
decide for them (e.g. default options). Inferences drawn from these and
other studies support the tip-of-the-iceberg hypothesis, although no single
study has examined the total process from problem occurrence through
voicing perception, complaining, and resolution. This study takes a pivotal
step in the direction of validating or refuting inferences that the stages are
empirically linked.
Figure 1 depicts the five-stage conceptual model of the problem-solving
process that guides our analysis: occurrence, perception, voicing, complaint-handling, and resolution. The stages are sequential. Consumers may
"exit," thus terminating the process at any stage. Exit actions are the key
to the tip-of-the-iceberg theory in that they represent the unseen part of the
universe of complaints.

Figure 1. Model of the Consumer Problem-Solving Process
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Stage 1 involves the incidence, occurrence, of an event involving a problem or defect in a product or service; occurrence represents the universe of
problems in the population. Stage 2 indicates that consumer perception that
a problem or dispute with a seller/provider exists is prerequisite to action.
Perception of problems associated with products or services may be shadowed by a number of factors, including the difficulty in finding the relevant
facts (Best 1981). Facts may not be evident to injured parties; therefore,
they do not perceive a legitimate problem or follow through on their dissatisfaction. All too often, consumers are not aware of their rights regarding redress and the process of complaining. Many consumers have difficulty
defining and articulating problems. Perception is prerequisite to active
recognition that a problem or complaint exists—but does not address action.
Stage 3, voicing, is the first step where problem-solving action may, but
does not necessarily, occur. Voicing a problem to others varies from merely
giving injured parties some satisfaction (as in "getting things off their
chest") to initiation of major action toward rectification or resolution. In
general, consumers are not well-informed about how to complain and contact third-party complaint agencies. Analyses show that some groups of
consumers, in particular low-socioeconomic status consumers, tend to have
lower participation rates regarding voicing of complaints to problem-solving agencies (Thomas & Shuptrine 1975; Haefner & Leckenby 1975).
Voicing to a legitimate third-party complaint-handling agency is an obstacle for some consumers. Consumers possessing little knowledge of complaint resolution agencies may have to contact two or even three agencies
before the dispute ends up in the right hands. This may create great psychological and economic costs for consumers and, after several attempts
which result in reaching inappropriate agencies, they may become resigned
to accept the situation and give up. This reinforces the belief that complaining does not generate positive results.
Complaining to a seller or a third-party is Stage 4 of the complaining
process (voicing and complaining may occur simultaneously). If consumers
are motivated to pursue a problem to positive resolution, they will complain to the seller, manufacturer, service provider, or to a third-party
agency. Barriers to complaining include lack of self confidence and/or
motivation, difficulty in determining the facts, difficulty in identifying
legal rights, the frequently complex and time-consuming character of the
complaining process, and inadequate awareness of legitimate third-party
complaint-handling programs (Best 1981; Thomas & Shuptrine 1975;
Haefner & Leckenby 1975).
Finally, Stage 5, resolution, involves the action process culminating in a
decision, or outcome of complaints. Resolutions may be successful or
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unsuccessful from the perspective of the consumer. The majority of consumers enter the complaining process to achieve a successful outcome for
their complaint. Resolution may occur at any stage in the complaining process; that is, one must not pass sequentially through each stage before resolution may occur. Ideally, complaints that are not successfully resolved at
an earlier stage will proceed to the next stage of the complaining process.

Conflicting Perspectives on the Problem-Solving Process
Empirical documentation of the process is important for both research
and practice. While the stages of the problem-solving process are fairly
straightforward and logical, there is considerable debate in the field about
whether most consumers have access to the entire process, or whether barriers exist which prevent some (or most) from proceeding to the later
stages. Best (1981), Warland (1977, 1984), and Hyman (1981, 1990) contend that the problem-solving process operates to discourage consumers
from proceeding through the various stages. There are barriers to perceiving, voicing, complaint handling, and resolution. Only a portion of the
problems/defects that exist are actually perceived; only a portion of those
perceived are voiced; only a portion of those voiced gain access to a complaint-resolving party; and only a portion at each stage are resolved successfully. They infer that the body of complaints that reach a third-party
complaint program is but a fragment of those that exist. This perspective
follows from the systemic pattern perspective and encapsulates the "tip-ofthe-iceberg theory."
Another perspective, which we associate with the organizational aberration theory, is that most problems and complaints are dealt with directly
and at the appropriate level. This perspective emerges from the organizational literature and from numerous discussions with managers and directors of corporations and consumer service programs. Complaints are seen
as resulting from serendipitous breakdowns, exceptions to the rule, which
affect only those few people who complain. It is also reasoned that seriousness determines the level of action. Consumers will not act if the problem is not worth their effort. Less serious problems are dealt with by
sellers/providers. The few complaints that reach later stages of the complaint process represent the universe of serious complaints that exist. We
are unable to locate studies of management's response to complaints and
how they are used in organizational processes.
Two corollaries to the organizational aberration theory also endure. One,
the "chronic complainer hypothesis," contends that many of the complaints
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to third-party complaint-handling organizations are from a few people who
habitually complain about everything. This argument is usually accompanied by the assertion that most complaints are not really important and that
people should be able to handle these complaints without assistance from
others. The second argument, the "serious complaints hypothesis," suggests
that the complaints that reach a third-party organization are the more serious complaints: all others are minor complaints. Both of these arguments
imply that the complaints that reach a third-party organization should be
considered in themselves and that inferences to the broader population and
about the systems that generated them are not proper. The tip-of-the-iceberg theory denies these assertions. The empirical analysis presented herein
is thus a test of the iceberg theory and will shed light on whether the organizational aberration or systemic pattern theories are more appropriate. Our
analytical framework is as follows.
The Organizational Aberration and the Systemic Pattern Theories
If all consumer problems arc perceived, voiced, and presented to the
offending business or organization, then the universe of complaints is the
universe of problems experienced by consumers. This situation, depicted
below as Hypothesis 1 (Figure 2), flows from the organizational aberration
theory.
If, however, individual personality, organizational, or environmental factors operate to inhibit the problem-solving process at any of the stages following occurrence, then the universe of problems perceived, voiced, and
complained about will be successively smaller than the universe of problems experienced by consumers. This latter situation is depicted in
Hypothesis 2 (Figure 2), and is associated with the systemic pattern perspective.1 A number of writers suggest that the latter case is, in fact, what
tends to occur in the real world (Best 1981; Warland, Herrmann & Moore
1984; Hyman 1990).
Some policymakers and researchers take this reasoning one step further
(Krendel 1970; Hyman 1987, 1990). They suggest that the complaints
which reach a third-party complaint-handling agency can be equated to a
sample of those that exist in the broader environment (Farrell 1986). While
the representativeness of the complaint sample of the larger universe of
problems is a researchable question, there is a substantial drop-off from
perception to voicing to complaining. Further, only a portion of the complaints ever reach a third-party complaint-handling agency. It follows, then,
that the messages inherent in a few complaints can be said to "represent"
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Hypothesis 1
Organizational Aberration

Hypothesis 2
Systemic Pattern

Hypothesis 1A - Chronics
Chronic Complainers

Hypothesis IB
Seriousness

Figure 2. Competing Hypotheses about the Problem-Solving Process

probable patterns of others that exist but do not reach the third-party complaint stage.2
If complaints which reach the third-party level are reflective of those
that do not, then analysis of patterns and trends of complaints can provide
"indicator areas" where attention by managers and policymakers may be
appropriate. Aggregate analysis of the "tip-of-the-iceberg" thus produces
"error signals" and "problem indicators" of underlying potential problems
in policy, law, regulation, or procedure. Despite the assertion in the literature that this latter perspective is accurate, and the fact that the approach
has been effectively applied in a number of areas, the fundamental assumptions have not been empirically demonstrated heretofore in a single study.
We tested these hypotheses with data from a major statewide study.
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Data and Methods
A 1985 statewide representative sample of residential telephone customers in Pennsylvania is the primary database for the analysis. The sample
was selected using modified random digit dialing to assure representation
of customers with both listed and unlisted telephone numbers. The final
sample size is 500, based on a 59 percent response rate. Sampling tolerances are estimated at plus or minus 3 to 4 percent at the 0.05 level of significance. A second source of data is from a 1981 sample of general
residential electric utility customers in Pennsylvania. The sample was randomly assigned based upon residential utility customer account numbers
provided by all regulated electric utility companies in the state. The final
sample size is 559 based on a 65 percent response rate. Sampling tolerances are similar to those for the 1985 study. Analyses herein are from the
1985 study unless identified otherwise.
Pennsylvania has the fourth largest urban population and the largest
rural population among the fifty states. Ninety-six percent of the residential households receive electric service from regulated utility companies,
and ninety-seven percent have telephone service. We tested for differences
in results on similar items between the samples which would not be
expected to change significantly between the two studies (e.g. heating
fuel). Differences are not statistically significant; thus we suggest the
results of the two studies are mutually supportive and comparable. The
studies are considered to be representative of utility consumers statewide;
and, because of the market penetration of utilities, they are fairly representative of the population.
Our data allow us to examine the consumer complaining process in general with specific focus on utility problems, such as with electric, gas,
water, or telephone service. Utility services provide necessities of life, such
as heating, lighting, water heating, drinking, cooking, and communications
(Hyman 1987). One does not have to look further than the daily newspaper to find examples of the importance of utility services or of the consequences of unvoiced or unresolved complaints and problems with utility
service. Many people on fixed incomes, including the poor and elderly,
find themselves without heat or telephone service because they cannot successfully resolve a problem with their bill or service. Each winter newspapers carry reports of people who freeze to death following the termination
of their utility services. Fires often result from poor equipment or from
consumer actions to compensate for the lack of utility services, such as
heating or lighting. Thus, utility services are important elements of household budgets, essential components of modern living, and can provide an
important source of data on the complaining process.
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Research Findings
Differential Perception: The Universe of Consumer Problems

3

To document the initial stages of the complaining process—occurence
and perception—consumers were asked if they had a problem or complaint
about a variety of products and services during the past two years (198385). The items (Table 1) are derived from the Consumer Problem Index as
developed by Warland et al. (1984). The utility and telephone items were
added for this study. Consumers' perception of problems vary across the
categories mentioned. Results of the reliability test (Chronbach's Alpha) is
similar to that for the Warland study both without and with the two additional items included. At most, only one in four consumers perceive a problem or complaint in any of the ten areas, and in some areas less than one
in ten perceive a problem. Thus, consumer problem perceptions appear to
involve a judgment/motivation process as suggested by previous studies,
and the rate of problem perception differs across products/services, suggesting differences in the occurrence-perception processes predicted by
Hypothesis 2.
Note also that perception of complaints about utility companies (telephone or gas/electric) does not show an appreciably higher or lower rate of
Table 1.
Perception of Major Consumer Problems
"During the past two years (1983-85),
have you had a problem or complaint about..."

YES
Misleading advertising
A utility company (gas/electric) service
Defective products
Poor quality auto repairs
Mail order sales
Telephone service
Little attention to consumer complaints
Health Insurance
Misleading packaging and labeling
Home improvements

24.6
21.6
21.2
20.4
18.0
17.8
17.2
12.2
10.4
8.3
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occurrence as compared to other types. Utility services (gas and/or electric)
are mentioned second most often out of ten areas. Telephone rates are
sixth. Thus, some consumers perceive problems with their utility service,
and the rates are not significantly distinct from those for other areas.
Irrespective of occurrence rates, the problem perception rate is about 10 to
20 percent across the ten areas. A minority of consumers perceive problems
in any one area.
The Pervasiveness of Problem Perception
The data reported in Table 1 indicate that ten to twenty percent of consumers perceive problems in each of the ten areas in a two-year period.
These data do not indicate the percentage of consumers that report problems across several or all areas. Figure 3 addresses this latter issue; it presents data on the percent of people (in the representative statewide sample)
who report having consumer problems in zero to ten areas. The data reflect
the total number of areas where a respondent reported having a problem (a
respondent could thus perceive problems in zero to ten areas). These data
allow us to identify whether most consumers perceive some problems or
whether a few consumers perceive most problems.

Figure 3. The Pervasiveness of Complaining Pyramid
(Percent of consumers reporting problems or complaints in ten areas.)
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The data show that problem perception is spread widely throughout the
population. First, over one-third report no problems in any of the ten areas
in a two-year period. Second, a majority report problems in three or fewer
areas. This means that the overwhelming majority report problems in one
or more areas—even though no single area is perceived by a majority.
Finally, only a small percentage of consumers report problems in six to
nine areas, and no consumers report problems in all ten areas. Most problems that have an opportunity to enter the problem-solving process are identified by people who perceive problems in only a few areas over a two-year
period. We conclude that perception of problems is a selective process—
only a portion of the universe of consumers perceive problems. Perception
varies considerably across the wide majority of the consumer public; and,
as seen below, generally across various socioeconomic groupings.
Who Are the Problem Perceivers?
A comparison of the social background characteristics of consumers
who perceive utility problems to the general population shows that problem perceivers are generally similar to the overall population, although
some differences do exist (Table 2). Both telephone and utility problem
perceivers are quite similar to the overall consumer population. That is,
there are few differences between groups with different types of complaints. Older people, retired people, and people with incomes less than
$10,000 do tend to perceive problems at lower rates than the average consumer. We conclude that utility problem perceivers are quite similar to a
cross-section of the overall consumer population.
Are Most Perceivers "Chronic" or Habitual Complainers?
These data also allow us to address the question of whether most consumers who complain are "chronic" complainers. Webster defines chronic
as "marked by long duration or frequent occurrence." By our standards,
individuals are considered to be chronic complainers if they perceive problems in most of the areas studied during a two-year period. Looking again
at Figure 3, we see first that the overwhelming majority of consumers report
problems in zero to four areas. Second, less than 10 percent report problems
in five to seven areas. Third, only a minuscule proportion reports problems
in eight or nine areas (less than one percent of the total), and no consumers
report problems in all ten areas. These data do not eliminate the fact that
there may be a few chronic complainers; it does indicate that the overwhelming number of problems perceived are not by chronic complainers.
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Table 2.
Social Background of Consumers with Utility Problems or Complaints in
Two Years (1983-1985)
Telephone
Complaint

NO
%
AGE
LT 30
30-44
45-59
60 +
EDUCATION
LT H.S.
H.S. Grad
Some College
College Grad
EMPLOYMENT
Employed
Unemployed
Retired
Homemaker
MARITAL STATUS
Married
Single
Divorced
Widowed
INCOME
LT $10K
$10K-$20K
$20K-$35K
S35K+

YES
%

17
20
33
53
26
18
24
9
p = .001
18
43
16
23
p = .2

9
49
14
28
(n.s.)

Utility
Complaint

Statewide
Average

NO
%

TOTAL
%

YES
%

16
20
34
48
25
20
11
25
.002
p=
9
45
19
15
23
27
p = .2 (n.s.)

17
37
24
22

18

16

44

44

16
24

69
87
5
8
20
6
5
0
p = .001

84
69
7
5
7
20
2
6
p = .006

72
6
17
5

66
63
13
16
8
16
13
6
p = .05

68
58
11
21
12
9
12
9
p = .05

66
13
10
11

21
12
26
27
44
29
24
17
p = . 2 (n.s.)

19
26
33
22

21
26
32
21
p = .3

9
26
37
28
(n.s.)

*Chi Square test used in data analysis, (n.s.) = not significant. The Chi Square test statistic is
considered statistically significant at the p =.05 level or better.
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To summarize the analysis so far, the universe of problem perceivers is
smaller than the universe of consumers. Problem perceivers vary in the
number of problems perceived over a two-year period. Most problems are
not perceived by "chronic" complainers. Problem perceivers are widely
distributed throughout the population. These findings support the initial
part of "tip-of-the-iceberg" hypothesis. It refutes the chronic complainers
hypothesis. The next section examines data on the voicing/complaining
stages of the model.
Voicing and Complaint-handling
The "tip-of-the-iceberg" theory is supported fully only if it can be
demonstrated that many consumers who experience problems do not present problems or complaints to complaint-handling organizations, especially those that are more serious. Table 3 shows responses for items
derived from previous studies (Warland 1977; Hyman 1990). People were
asked to respond "yes" or "no" to a series of questions about "actions you
may have taken" during the past two years to deal with problems or complaints with products or service. They were asked whether they told others
about a problem, stopped using the product/service, complained to the
seller, complained to the manufacturer, complained to a private third-party
organization, or complained to a governmental third-party. Consumers
could answer "no" to all possible actions; they could answer "yes" to more
than one. Respondents who answered "no" to all six categories and did not
indicate an "other" response are recorded as having done "nothing."
Table 3 shows that there are varying degrees of action that individuals
pursue when faced with dissatisfaction over products or services. More
than one in three consumers (36 percent) do nothing about perceived problems. Over half of the consumers, however, tell someone else about their
dissatisfaction (54 percent). "Someone else" is generally a family member
or friend. For many, complaining stops at this point. The effort required to
contact the seller and to articulate the problem, the anxiety over what may
happen when confronting a seller or manager, and similar barriers to voicing beyond family and friends have been documented elsewhere (Best
1981). Moreover, the sense of dissatisfaction or injustice may fade with
continued voicing to understanding peers. Voicing may temporarily relieve
the anxiety for the consumer even though the problem still exists. In addition, some people simply "stop using" the product or service. Just less than
one in three (31 percent) indicate they took this action.
The "do nothing," "told others," and "stopped using" actions play a key
role in understanding the "tip-of-the-iceberg." They represent consumers
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Table 3.
Voicing/Complaining Channels: Action Taken on Perceived Consumer
Problems
Contacted:
Government
BBB or C. of C.
Manufacturer
Seller/Manager
Stopped Using
Told Others (family, friend)
Nothing

Percent
6
10
29
35
31
54
36

N = 500

who drop out of the complaining process (exit) at a very early stage—a
stage at which neither the seller, manufacturer/provider, nor third-party
organizations have an opportunity to address the issue directly (presumably
if enough consumers stop using a product or service, the message will
come through indirectly). Actions involving exit from the process without
directly addressing the problem represent the majority of responses to perceived consumer problems. The preponderance of complaints is unknown
to those who might do something about them.
A minority of problem perceivers report actions that allow their problem
to be addressed directly. Just over one in three contact the seller/manager
(35 percent). Somewhat fewer contact the manufacturer (29 percent). The
seller/manufacturers have the largest opportunity to provide redress
(although only for a minority of perceived problems). Third-party organizations have a less than one-in-ten opportunity to deal with perceived problems and complaints. Private sector third-party organizations (such as the
Better Business Bureaus and Chambers of Commerce), are contacted by 10
percent of the consumers. Public sector, third-party organizations (such as
consumer protection offices or public officials), are contacted by 6 percent
of the consumers. Thus, for the overwhelming majority of consumers who
perceive problems in one or more of the ten general problem areas identified earlier, only a small minority report making contact with a third-party
complaint-handling organization about any of the problems they perceived
in a two-year period. These findings strongly support the hypothesis that
most consumer problems do not come to the attention of third-party complaint-handling programs. Hence, the data support Hypothesis 2—problems
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Figure 4. Heirarchy of Consumer Action on Problems/Complaints
"The Tip of the Iceberg"
reaching a third-party organization represent the "tip-of-the-iceberg" of
problems which exist in the broader consumer community.
Figure 4 depicts the hierarchy of consumer actions on problems or complaints. The universe of consumer problems which exists at the occurrence
stage is successively reduced at later stages to the point that only a small
percentage reach the complaining stage. This model of the consumer problem and action process is supported by the empirical data presented above.
Additional light is shed on the issue of chronic complainers and an associated issue that some "activists" may account for a large portion of the
complaints. We tested the likelihood that people who perceive more problems are the ones that take more actions by creating two combined scores
for each respondent as follows: the "problem perception index" is the total
number of areas where a respondent indicated having a problem in the last
two years (Table 1); the "voicing/complaining index" is the total number
of types of voicing/complaining actions taken (Table 3). Each consumer in
the study could have a problem index of zero to nine and a complaining
index of zero to six. In both cases, the higher number indicates higher
involvement.
As shown in Table 4, people perceiving zero or one problems tend to do
nothing; although those that do act are represented at all levels, but at a
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Table 4.
Problem Perception versus Voicing/Complaining
Problem
Perception
Index

Voicing/Complaining Index
Total
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

%/N

0-1

31.8

7.4

9.0

5.0

0.8

0.6

0.2

56.6/283

2-5

4.0

7.0

9.4

9.4

5.8

1.5

0.6

38.6/193

0.2

0.6

1.6

0.8

1.4

0.2

4.8/24

6-9

100/500
rapidly declining rate. People in the mid-range of perception (two to five
problem areas) have higher rates of voicing/complaining actions in the
mid-range as well. Finally, those highest on the problem index (six to nine
problem areas) are a small minority whose voicing/complaining actions
span the entire continuum of responses. (The Chi Square statistic is highly
significant for these data.) We conclude that most of the problems perceived by consumers receive little action on the hierarchy of voicing/complaining; and, those consumers who perceive a large number of problems
only infrequently go to the top in their search for redress.
Consumer Actions and Social Background
As noted earlier, utility problem perceivers come close to representing a
cross-section of the overall consumer population. A quite different pattern
emerges when we examine data on the social background of consumers
who pursue consumer problems to the voicing/complaining levels of the
complaint hierarchy (Table 5). The data show that income, education, age,
and employment status are significantly related to the complaining behavior of consumers. Significant differences exist between those who do nothing and those who take action; and there are also significant differences
between those who voice complaints and those who contact a complainthandling agency or manufacturer.
Income. Table 5 shows that fewer consumers (24 percent) in the $35,000
and above income bracket choose to do nothing about a problem or complaint. Consumers in this income group are more likely to contact the manufacturer about a faulty product. Twice as many consumers in the less than
$10,000 income category are more likely to do nothing about a problem or
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Table 5.
Action Taken on Complaints by Social Background
No
Action
%

By
Self
%

Ctc
Seller
%

Ctc.
Mfr.
%

3Rd.Pty

INCOME
LT $10K
$10K-$20K
$20K-$35K
$35K +

51
39
32
24

13
20
18
9

18
15
15
14

11
12
20
34

7
14
15
19

EDUCATION
LT H.S.
H.S. Grad
Some Coll.
College Gr.

51
42
23
22

16
18
13
12

22
11
21
17

5
16
26
33

6
14
18
15

25
32
36
50

18
12
18
17

21
12
17
17

20
27
16
10

16
17
13
6

35
26
37
47

13
24
15
18

15
17
19
16

21
21
19
11

16
12
11
9

EMPLOYMENT STATUS
Employed
32
36
Unemployed
Retired
45
Homemaker
68

14
14
19
18

15
25
18
5

24
7
11
5

15
18
8
5

%

AGE

LT 30
30-44
45-48
60+
MARITAL STATUS
Married
Single
Divorced
Widowed

Percentages total across rows.

n=500

complaint over a product or service. Lower income groups are less likely
to contact the manufacturer or a third-party to resolve the complaint.
Higher proportions of people in the upper income brackets are likely to
complain to a third-party.
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Education. Over half of the consumers with less than a high school education report doing nothing about a complaint. Consumers with some college education and college graduates have higher rates of authoritative
actions in response to consumer complaints. The college graduate group is
most likely to contact the manufacturer about a service or product problem.
Age. Fifty percent of the consumers 60 years of age or older do nothing
about a problem or complaint. These consumers may have difficulty accessing a manufacturer or third-party; therefore, they have fewer opportunities to
voice complaints when faced with dissatisfaction over a product or service.
Marital Status and Employment. Widowed consumers voice problems or
complaints to a manufacturer or third-party to a much lower degree than their
married counterparts. Likewise, retired persons or homemakers contact a
manufacturer or third-party at a much lower rate than employed consumers.
These data provide additional insight into the consumer complaining
process. We saw earlier that at the perceiving stage, the social background
of consumers is quite similar to that of the general consuming population.
Definite differences emerge at the voicing stage. At the complaint- handling stage the acting group is even more different. Those consumers who
drop out of the complaining process at earlier stages tend to have lower
incomes, lower levels of education, or to be over sixty. We also note that
consumers who experience socially stressful or less socially rewarded situations (such as unemployment, being a homemaker, or being widowed or
divorced) also show higher rales of inaction and lower levels of action.
It is hard to conceive situations where utility problems would systematically occur differentially based on these criteria. It seems most reasonable
to conclude that problem occurrence is most likely spread across all social
background categories; and, that consumers who encounter barriers, either
personal or external, to pursuing complaints at higher levels have higher
proportions of social disadvantage. This perspective is supported by the
analysis of perceivers which shows lower social background differences
from non-perceivers. The process operates so that those who have tend to
get action, while those who have not tend to get inaction.
Do the Serious Complaints Filter Up to Third-Party Agencies?
Utility services for heating, cooking, and appliances are considered to be
necessities of life in contemporary society. Threat of deprivation of necessary utilities is a serious problem. The 1981 study gathered data on four
different statewide samples which allow us to examine the issue of whether
only serious problems arc presented to a third-party organization and conversely whether all serious problems reach the third-party. The four
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samples are comprised of the following: the general statewide consumer
population, people with overdue utility bills who received a termination
notice that their service would be shut-off in ten days if the bill was not
paid (termination notice sample), people whose service was actually terminated for nonpayment (service terminated sample), and people who contacted the public utility commission for mediation of payment problems
with utility companies following a ten-day notice (PUC/BCS). People were
asked, "Have you had a problem or complaint about a utility company service or bill in the past year?" (The question for the utility commission sample was preceded by, "Other than a problem managing your utility bill,
have you had a problem or complaint...?")
Note first that the percentages of each sample reporting a problem are
similar with the exception of the service terminated group. The percentage
of people who perceive they have problems does not vary substantially,
even for the more serious termination notice group. In addition, over half
of the service terminated group did not perceive their termination situation
as a "problem or complaint about a utility." Problems exist across the spectrum of seriousness, and many people in serious situations do not perceive
that problems as such exist. Second, the patterns of action taken are all
similar. All four groupings overwhelmingly report contacting the business
involved, and only small percentages report contacting public officials or
the complaint agency (utility commission). Higher percentages of those in
the more serious situations do contact the complaint agency, but at most
only one in six. Finally, note that the successful resolution rates (". . . did
you get what you wanted?") are almost identical: successful resolutions are
reported for just less than half of all complaints for all groupings.
Successful resolutions are higher for the general and notice populations
than for those whose service was terminated for nonpayment (Table 6).
Again, there is a clear message contained in the data. Only a small percentage of problems is presented to third-party complaint-handling organizations. This is true even of those seriously threatened with deprivation of
utilities that are considered necessities of life. The business involved
resolves problems successfully in only a minority of the cases (except
where an overdue bill is involved). These data support the "tip-of-the-iceberg" theory and document the need for third-party complaint-handling
programs.
Does the Tip Reflect the Berg?
An associated issue addresses the question of whether the complaints
that reach a third-party organization are a specialized subset, or whether
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Table 6.
Complaint Perception, Voicing , and Seriousness (1981 Study)
General
Consumer
Population
%

Overdue/
Service
Termination Terminated
Notice
Nonpayment
%
%

Contacted
Utility
Commission
%

PERCEPTION— GENERAL CONSUMER PROBLEMS
Had Consumer Problems in
88.7
the Last Year
No
84.7
88.6
(type not specified) Yes
15.3
11.3
11.5

85.2
14.8

PERCEPTION— UTILITY PROBLEMS
Had Utility Problem No
75.7
in Last Year
Yes
24.3

76.8
23.2*

71.9
28.1

58.0
42.0

COMPLAINING—ACTION TAKEN ON UTILITY PROBLEM
11
23
17
Did You Contact
No
77
83
89
Anyone About it? Yes
Who was contacted?
Nobody/Handled by Self
The Business Involved
Public Officials/
Complaint Agency

17.9
76.7

10.8
84.1

5.4

3.3

RESOLUTION OF UTILITY PROBLEM
Successfully Resolved by
Company—No Overdue Bill 41
Successfully Resolved by
Company—Overdue Bill

73

14.1
78.9
7.05

15
85
9.7
74.1

16.1

44

42

41

62

49

N/A

they are reflective of the broader universe of complaints. Table 7 presents
data on the types of problems reported by the general residential and service terminated samples, along with the universe of all cases presented to
the Public Utility Commission's Bureau of Consumer Services (PUC/BCS).
The same coding scheme was used for all three data sets.
The comparisons in Table 7 are quite revealing. The general sample and
the PUC/BCS universe are quite similar, supporting the generalization that

118

SOCIOLOGICAL PRACTICE/1992

Table 7.
Does the Tip Reflect the Berg?
Billing/
Credit

Rates

Termination
Services of Service Other

Total
N

General Pop.

49.2

20.3

25.8

2.4

2.3

100/128

Terminated
Customer

56.5

13.9

9.2

15.8

4.6

100/108

PUC/BCS
Clients* (1981)

48.1

6.1

28.3

10.0

7.5

100/6670

*Source: Consumer Services Activity Report: 1981, PA Public Utility Commission, June 1982.

the problems that reach the third-party consumer organization are generally
reflective of the types of problems that exist in the general population. Two
differences are notable. Rate complaints are much more prevalent in the
general population than in the PUC/BCS universe; termination problems
are more extensive in the PUC/BCS group. Note, too, that the service terminated and PUC/BCS clients defined (perceived) their problems as
billing/credit rather than termination of service issues, shedding some light
on the differential perception phenomenon. The sample of terminated customers is skewed considerably toward the billing/credit and terminationrelated problem areas. These findings are not surprising given the serious
nature of having basic utility services terminated. We conclude that there
is only a slight tendency toward more serious complaints to gravitate
toward third-party organizations, and that only a proportion of the serious
complaints that exist reach this level.
Discussion and Conclusions
Consumers' dependence on a market environment is increasing, and
their confidence in businesses to provide honest service and high quality
products is diminishing (Best 1981). Consumers must rely upon sellers to
provide high quality products at fair and reasonable prices. Consumer problems arise when buyers feel they are not receiving proper goods or services, when problems or defects exist, or when they are not treated fairly.
In this environment, the burden of action typically is on individuals, who
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have the responsibility to express their dissatisfaction to sellers/manufacturers. Action based on individual problems, however, does not address
systemic patterns or problems.
This analysis supports the "tip-of-the-iceberg" perspective to consumer
complaining and problem solving. The problems that reach a third-party
program such as an ombudsman, consumer protection agency, or regulatory
commission are but a portion of those that exist in the community. In their
own way, then, complaints that reach this level can be said to "represent"
many others that for whatever reason are not voiced. This perspective has
been adopted by many ombudsman and complaint-handling programs both
nationally and internationally.
While data on Stage 1, occurrence, is not available, the study shows that
Stage 2, perception of consumer problems/complaints, occurs for only a
portion of the general population. Most importantly, consumers' responses
to perceived problems and complaints vary considerably: many do nothing,
others simply voice their complaints to acquaintances or stop buying the
product. A considerable proportion are presented to the seller/manufacturer
for redress. Only a small percentage, however, ever reach the third-party
complaint-handling stage. Thus it is reasonable to infer that for each complaint reaching a third-party complaint program, many others most likely
occur in the broader community—some of which get effective action.
From the tip-of-the-iceberg perspective, the resolution of those complaints that do not reach the third-party stage is a secondary issue. If a
broader pool of complaints exists, it is most likely reflective of systemic
problems in products or services, which in turn are indicators that call for
action on issues of policy, management, or substance. This is not to say
that resolution at lower levels is not an important issue, but it is important
mainly from the perspective of the individuals who experience the problem. The mere existence of the larger pool of problems in an aggregate
sense should be a phenomenon of considerable concern to managers and
policy makers. Identification of patterns by analyzing the portion that
reaches the complaining stage can provide a valuable tool for those responsible for accountability, guidance, and control.
We are not articulating an idea which is unknown to the American consumer. Complaints that number in the hundreds frequently lead to product
recalls numbering in the millions. The few complaints which are voiced
and do reach the managerial or policy-making level provide indicators of
potentially, broad-based problems, which in turn, are used to trigger investigation and, as appropriate, correction of policies, products, or services.
The few precipitate inquiry to determine whether the many exist and, if so,
to take corrective action. This analysis of the tip-of-the-iccberg theory and
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its implications provides insight for managers and policy makers at the
very top of the decision-making hierarchy. Managers who utilize a system
for tracking consumer complaints can key into specific problem areas for
further inquiry. In turn, changes in complaint rates in an area where action
has been taken, can be used to monitor implementation. The model of the
consumer problem-solving process needs to be expanded to reflect this perspective. Figure 5 depicts an expanded model that is in keeping with the
findings of this study and reflective of the systemic pattern perspective on
complaints. Exit from Stage 6, pattern analysis, represents missed opportunities for identifying systemic problems in policy, law, regulation or process. Exit from Stage 7, system change, represents missed opportunities for
changing organizational management, structure, or process in response to
the environmental feedback identified in Stage 6. The consequences of the
latter two actions are organizational adaptation or decreased accountability
and responsiveness.
The data from this study are a part of over a decade of work with utility-related complaints perceived by consumers in Pennsylvania. We know
that those complaints that reach the utility commission are reflective of
more that exist. For years, the utility commission in Pennsylvania has
tracked complaint rates, taking action with utility companies based on
investigation following analysis (Alexander 1986; Hyman 1987).
Monitoring of complaint rates following action appears to demonstrate the
utility of the hypothesis: declines tend to occur when companies take corrective action. Alexander (1986) demonstrates this phenomenon in an
examination of five case studies. Ritti and Silver (1986) also address the
Pennsylvania process of establishing new "rules of the game" for public
utility operations.

Figure 5. Expanded Model of the Consumer Problem-Solving Process
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We are not talking about complaint tracking simply as a way to improve
consumer operations units, as would be the response of those using the
organizational aberration perspective (although that may occur). We are
talking about complaint tracking as a source of strategic intelligence about
aspects of the entire system as envisioned by the systemic pattern theory.
The use of consumer complaints as problem and organizational indicators
promises to thrust consumer affairs directly into the organizational policy
and decision-making arena. From this perspective, the ideas examined
herein apply and individual complaints take on a meaning far beyond their
immediate content. Each complaint which contributes to the aggregate may
carry messages about broader patterns which exist in the environment.
Complaints may be reflective not just of specific situations, but of product,
service, and operations in general. From this perspective, the "tip-of-theiceberg" principle may allow complaint-handling operations to serve both
early-warning and fail-safe functions. We believe it behooves those in positions of responsibility to take note and to take action. Safer, more effective, high quality service and accountable operations are the result.
NOTES
1. We can also conceptualize situations where complaints are imagined, unjustified, or
contrived, which could lead to a situation where the universe of complaints is larger than the
universe of problems.
2. This perspective does not assert the converse, that the complaints that reach a thirdparty are representative of all types of complaints in the population. It does assert that for
each complaint that reaches a third-party there are probably others of that type in the broader
population.
3. The occurrence of problems, Stage 1, is practically impossible to document quantitatively. It would require either continuous observation of respondents for an extended period
of time, or extensive personal diaries. Thus, perception becomes the most feasible point at
which to begin analysis.
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